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Repose for Manufacturers: Six Year Statutory Bar to Products
Liability Actions Upheld-Tetterton v. Long Manufacturing Co.
During the mid-1970s an alleged "crisis" occured in the products liability
field.' Liability insurance rates for manufacturers soared as the insurance indus-
try complained of a nationwide outbreak of awards to plaintiffs in products lia-
bility suits.2 Legislatures in many states reacted by enacting various provisions
designed to limit this perceived unfairness to manufacturers.3 A major conse-
quence of this legislative action was the adoption in many states of statutes of
repose4 barring any products liability suit after the product had been on the
market a specific number of years. 5
In 1979 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted North Carolina
General Statutes section 1-50(6),6 which provides that "[n]o action for the re-
covery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to property based upon
1. Several courts and commentators have set forth the details of the "crisis." See, e.g., Heath
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 522, 464 A.2d 288, 293-94 (1983); Dworkin, Product Liabil-
ity of the 1980s: 'Repose is not the Destiny' of Manufacturers, 61 N.C.L. REv. 33, 33-36 (1982);
McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM.
U.L. REv. 579, 579-80 (1981); Vargo, Products Liability, 15 IND. L. REV. 289, 289-90 n.2 (1982).
2. There is substantial doubt whether a crisis of the proportions asserted by the insurance
industry ever existed. Almost certainly, it does not exist today. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 1, at
59-61; Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56
N.C.L. REV. 663, 663-65 (1978); Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability
Law-A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 243-44 (1978); Vargo, supra note 1, at 289-90
n.2 (concluding that the alleged "crisis" was false and unsubstantiated).
3. In 1979 the North Carolina General Assembly responded with the Products Liability Act.
Act of May 28, 1979, ch. 654, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687. The general assembly enacted chapter 99B
of the North Carolina General Statutes, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-1 to -4 (1979), which contains the
substantive provisions of North Carolina products liability law. The general assembly also amended
several sections of chapter 1 of the General Statutes. One amendment to chapter 1 was the addition
of a six-year statute of repose in products liability actions in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (1983). See
generally Blanchard & Abrams, North Carolina's New Product Liability Act A Critical Analysis, 16
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 171 (1980) (discussing details of the Act's adoption in addition to its sub-
stantive provisions).
4. A statute of repose functions mainly as a substantive element of a cause of action. It should
be distinguished from a statute of limitations, which functions as a procedural limit on the enforce-
ment of accrued causes of action. See infra notes 20-32 and accompanying text. A majority of
products liability statutes of repose run after ten or twelve years. A few, however, run after six or
eight years. See infra note 22.
5. The first statute of repose for products liability actions was adopted in Utah in 1977. Mc-
Govern, supra note 1, at 588 n.50 (discussing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977)). Among the
other states that subsequently passed such statutes are Alabama, ALA. CODE § 6-5-502(c) (Supp.
1985); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
403(3) (Supp. 1985); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West Cum. Supp. 1986);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West 1979); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11(b)(2)
(1982); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 6-1303 (Supp. 1985); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213
(Smith-Hurd 1984); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1985); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513 (1983); Kentucky, KY. REv. STAT. § 411.310(1) (Supp. 1984); Ne-
braska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-224 (1979); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2
(1983); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (1983); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-
01.1-02 (Supp. 1985); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 30-905(1) (1985); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-1-13(b) (1985); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1982); Tennessee,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060(2) (Supp.
1986).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (1983).
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or arising out of any alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product shall be
brought more than six years after the date of initial purchase for use or con-
sumption."'7 Because this statute bars8 any products liability suit 9 for products
on the market more than six years, it has evoked substantial criticism.10 Attacks
on the statute have focused largely on the potential constitutional deficiencies of
section 1-50(6)."
7. Id. In a products liability action in North Carolina a second statute of repose, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-52(16) (1983), is also applicable. The statute provides that although a cause of action for
personal injury or property damage accrues at the time the injury becomes apparent or reasonably
should have become apparent, no action may be brought more than 10 years after the last wrongful
act of the defendant. This statute will have far less impact in the products liability field than § 1-
50(6), however, because the six-year limitation of § 1-50(6) will bar most actions. The primary pur-
pose of § 1-52(16) appears to have been adoption of the discovery rule, see infra note 69, rather than
repose for manufacturers. See Note, Wilder v. Amatex Corp.: A First Step Toward Ameliorating the
Effects of Statutes of Repose on Plaintiffs with Delayed Manifestation Diseases, 64 N.C.L. REV. 414,
422-23 (1986). The North Carolina Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of § 1-
52(16). See Wilder v. Amatex Corp., 314 N.C. 550, 336 S.E.2d 66 (1985) (avoiding the constitution-
ality issue of § 1-15(b), the predecessor of § 1-52(16), by finding it inapplicable to cases of delayed
manifestation disease). But see Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding
the constitutionality of § 1-15(b)).
8. A primary focus of constitutional attacks on statutes of repose is that these statutes function
as an absolute bar to otherwise valid claims. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
9. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the statute of repose in § 1-50(6) estab-
lishes a condition precedent to the commencement of any action under chapter 99B of the North
Carolina General Statutes. See Berick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 446-47, 293 S.E.2d 405, 412-13
(1982).
10. For criticism of § 1-50(6), see Blanchard & Abrams, supra note 3, at 196-202 (suggesting
that courts either rule the statute unconstitutional or limit its scope in application); Note, Limitation
of Actions: The Effect of Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp. on Future Cases Determining the Consti-
tutionality of G.S. 1-50(6), 19 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 1049, 1072 (1983) (arguing that the six-year
limitation is arbitrary and may decrease a manufacturer's emphasis on safety).
Almost 100 years ago, in Andres v. Powell, 97 N.C. 155, 2 S.E. 235 (1887), the North Carolina
Supreme Court faced an issue analogous to the one raised by § 1-50(6). The majority in Andres
upheld the lower court's application of a statute of repose giving creditors of deceased persons seven
years after death to sue the estate. Id. at 158, 2 S.E. at 239. Justice Merrimon, dissenting, objected
that the statute of repose in Andres barred plaintiff's action before it arose. Merrimon argued that
the majority, by upholding the statute of repose, reached the "absurd result of barring a party's debt
or demand before it becomes actionable." Id. at 159, 2 S.E. at 239. Rather than viewing the statute
as invalid, however, Justice Merrimon read it as a statute of limitations barring a cause of action only
after accrual, and not as a statute of repose that began at the decedent's death and barred an action
irrespective of its accrual date. Based on the statutory language, Justice Merrimon's conclusion was
questionable. However, he viewed his position as an "equitable construction of the act" designed to
avoid the harsh result ensuing from application of the statute of repose. Id. at 170, 2 S.E. at 243.
11. For example, constitutional attacks may be based on: (1) equal protection of the law, see
infra notes 40-66 and accompanying text; (2) state constitutional provisions guaranteeing open ac-
cess to the judicial system for redress of injuries, see infra notes 78-103 and accompanying text; or
(3) due process of law, see infra notes 111-28 and accompanying text.
To date, the courts of ten states have considered the constitutionality of a products liability
statute of repose similar to § 1-50(6). The statute has been held constitutional in Pullum v. Cincin-
nati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985); Thorton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d
522 (1981); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207 (1981); Tetterton v. Long
Mfg. Co., 314 N.C. 44, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985); and Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66 Or. App. 541, 674 P.2d
1194, rev. denied, 297 Or. 82, 679 P.2d 1367 (1984). The statute has been held unconstitutional in
Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Battillia v. Allis Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980), overruled by, Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985);
Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983); Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g
Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984); Davgaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply Assoc., 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D.
1984); and Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
Federal courts have also considered the constitutionality of products liability statutes of repose.
See Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1983) (constitutional), cert. denied, 467
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In Tetterton v. Long Manufacturing Co. 12 the North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld section 1-50(6) under a variety of constitutional attacks.13 This
Note analyzes the court's rejection of the constitutional challenges to section 1-
50(6) and discusses the possibilities for successful constitutional challenges to
the application of section 1-50(6) in fact situations not present in Tetterton. It
concludes that, although there are limited circumstances in which the statute
could be found unconstitutional as applied to particular plaintiffs, the primary
hope for mitigating the unfairness of section 1-50(6) lies in legislative
modification.
In Tetterton plaintiff's husband was killed while operating an allegedly de-
fective tobacco harvester manufactured by defendant, Long Manufacturing
Company. His death occured on July 8, 1981, and plaintiff filed suit on October
6, 1981, almost six years and seven months after the tobacco harvester was first
purchased for use. 14 The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant
on the ground that plaintiff's action was barred by section 1-50(6).15 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. 16
The sole issue on appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court was the
constitutionality of section 1-50(6).17 Plaintiff challenged the statute on the
grounds that it violated three constitutional provisions: (1) equal protection of
the law; (2) the "exclusive emoluments" clause of the North Carolina Constitu-
U.S. 1231 (1984); Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1983) (consti-
tutional); Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983) (constitutional); Groth v. San-
do, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 453 (D. Neb. 1984) (constitutional); Ellison v. Northwest Eng'g Co., 521 F.
Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (unconstitutional based on state supreme court decision which was subse-
quently overruled); Kline v. J.I. Case Co., 520 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (constitutional).
12. 314 N.C. 44, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985).
13. Other courts had ruled on the constitutionality of § 1-50(6) before Tetterton. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals initially held § 1-50(6) unconstitutional in Bolick v. American Barmag
Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified, 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982), on
the ground that it violated the state constitutional guarantee of open access to courts. See infra notes
79-103 and accompanying text. On appeal, the supreme court strongly suggested in dicta that it
believed § 1-50(6) to be constitutional, but did not reach the issue directly because it found the
statute inapplicable to plaintiff's claim. Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 371, 293
S.E.2d 415, 421 (1982). Based on the dicta in Bolick and the supreme court's decision in Lamb v.
Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983) (upholding constitutionality of six-
year statute of repose for injuries caused by improvements to real estate), the court of appeals soon
reversed its initial ruling in Bolick and held § 1-50(6) constitutional. Colony Hill Condominium I
Assoc. v. Colony Co., 70 N.C. App. 390, 396, 320 S.E.2d 273, 277 (1984); Davis v. Mobilift Equip.
Co., 70 N.C. App. 621, 622, 320 S.E.2d 406, 406 (1984). Two federal courts also have upheld the
constitutionality of § 1-50(6) based on the North Carolina Supreme Court's dicta in Bolick. Brown
v. General Elec. Co., 584 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D.N.C. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 1085 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 189 (1984). The supreme court had an opportunity to speak definitively on the
constitutionality of § 1-50(6) in Moore v. Moody, 304 N.C. 719, 285 S.E.2d 811 (1982), but did not
do so because it found the petition for writ of certiorari improperly granted.
14. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 46, 332 S.E.2d at 68.
15. Id.
16. Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 67 N.C. App. 628, 313 S.E.2d 250 (1984), aff'd, 314 N.C. 44,
332 S.E.2d 67 (1985). The court of appeals refused to address the constitutionality of § 1-50(6)
because it found that the issue had been neither affirmatively raised nor ruled on in the lower court.
Id. at 630, 313 S.E.2d at 251. The supreme court, however, found that the record did indicate that
the statute's' constitutionality was challenged at trial and thus, was properly before the court on
appeal. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 47, 332 S.E.2d at 69.
17. Plaintiff admitted that her action was barred should the constitutionality of the statute be
upheld. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 48-49, 332 S.E.2d at 69-70.
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tion; and (3) the "open courts" guarantee of the North Carolina Constitution.
Plaintiff also contended that section 1-50(6) was unconstitutionally vague.18 In
a unanimous opinion, 19 the court upheld the statute against each of these four
challenges.
Section 1-50(6) is a statute of repose.20 Such a statute creates substantive
elements of the litigant's legal rights2 1 by setting a specific time period,2 2 usually
measured from the date a product is first sold for consumption, 23 after which no
cause of action in products liability may accrue. 24 Passage of a period of time
shorter than that established by the statute is thus a condition precedent to the
accrual of a plaintiff's cause of action.25 If the plaintiff's injury occurs after the
18. Id. at 48, 332 S.E.2d at 69.
19. Justice Vaughn did not participate in the decision. Id. at 59, 332 S.E.2d at 75.
20. McGovern identifies four meanings that courts have applied to the term "statute of repose."
First, repose generally may be used to refer to any limitation on the bringing of a legal action.
McGovern, supra note I at 582-83; see also Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 201,
293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972) (stating that "[a]ll statutes limiting in any way the time within which a
judicial remedy must be sought are statutes of repose"). Second, repose is used as a general term
covering several statutes, including statutes of limitations, that promote finality in legal relation-
ships. McGovern, supra note 1, at 583. Third, repose may be used to refer to that part of a statute of
limitations that places an outer limit on the applicability of the statute. Id. at 583-84. The final
meaning attached to repose, and the one used in this Note, draws a clear distinction between a
statute of repose and a statute of limitations. A statute of limitations begins to run at the time of
accrual of a cause of action but a statute of repose begins to run at a time unrelated to accrual and
may bar an action before it accrues. Id. at 584-86.
21. North Carolina courts have clearly recognized that § 1-50(6) is a substantive rather than a
procedural limitation. See Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 446-47, 293 S.E.2d 405, 412-13 (1982)
(viewing § 1-50(6) as a "statute of repose in that it places a cap or outer limit on the time period
within which a products liability action may be brought irrespective of when the claim accrues");
Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 594-95, 284 S.E.2d 188, 192 (The court found
that "[b]ecause G.S. 1-50(6) attempts to bar absolutely claims arising out of defects or failures in
relation to products after a period measured from a date other than the date of accrual of those
claims, it does not constitute a statute of limitation." Rather, "[i]t abolish[es] certain claims recog-
nized prior to its enactment."), modified, 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982).
22. The period is twelve years in Arizona, Florida, New Hampshire, and Washington. It is ten
years in Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. Kentucky and Oregon have an eight-year products
liability statute of repose. The period is six years in North Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah. For a
list of citations to the statutes with these provisions, see supra note 5.
23. In Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Utah, the statute of repose begins on the date the product is first
sold for consumption. In Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, and South Dakota, the period begins on
the date of delivery to the initial user. In Connecticut and New Hampshire the key date is when the
defendant parts with control of the product. In Alabama the period begins after the product is first
put to use, and in Kansas it is started by the act giving rise to the cause of action. For a list of
citations to statutes with these provisions, see supra note 5.
24. One court has held that the distinction between a statute of repose and a statute of limita-
tions is unimportant. See Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 1174, 455 S.W.2d 918, 920 (1970)
(the distinction "is largely a question of semantics and manipulation of legal theory"), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 901 (1971). The distinction is critical for constitutional analysis, however, because courts
usually impose a less demanding constitutional standard to a substantive statute of repose than to a
procedural statute of limitations. See infra notes 112-29 and accompanying text. Occasionally, a
court fails to appreciate the distinction between a statute of repose and a statute of limitations and
reviews the constitutionality of a statute of repose as if it were a statute of limitations. See, e.g.,
Joseph v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971).
25. Several courts and observers analyzing the constitutionality of statutes of repose have noted
this characteristic. See, e.g., Universal Eng'g Corp. v. Perez, 451 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1984); Skinner v.
Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 325 S.E.2d 469
(1985); Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983); Bolick v. American
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statute of repose period has run, the plaintiff has an injury for which the law
affords no remedy.2 6
For purposes of constitutional analysis, a statute of repose may be distin-
guished from a statute of limitations.27 A statute of limitations is a procedural
limitation on substantive rights. Rather than beginning at a time set by statute,
a statute of limitations begins to run on the date a plaintiff's cause of action
accrues.28 A statute of limitations prescribes a time period after accrual during
which suit must be brought, or the legal rights will be lost.29
In limited situations a statute of repose may also function procedurally
rather than substantively. 30 When a cause of action arises before the end of the
statute of repose period, the statute functions as a procedural bar to an action.3 1
For example, if a plaintiff is injured by a defective product in North Carolina five
years after its initial purchase date, section 1-50(6) gives that person one year in
which to file suit. As with a statute of limitations, any action beyond this time is
procedurally barred.32
The basic purpose of any statute of repose is practical in nature, focusing
exclusively on the defendant's convenience.33 As the Tetterton court observed,
Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982); Davis v. Mobilift Equip. Co., 70 N.C. App.
621, 320 S.E.2d 406 (1984); Dworkin, supra note 1, at 42-45.
26. The widely perceived unfairness of statutes of repose in barring access to courts for an
otherwise compensable injury is a common factor in decisions finding them unconstitutional. See
infra note 93 and accompanying text.
27. Courts are generally reluctant to overturn a statute of repose because it reflects the legisla-
ture's definition of substantive legal rights. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. In re-
viewing a statute of limitation, however, courts generally impose the somewhat more demanding test
of reasonableness. See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
28. A statute of limitations cannot begin to run until a plaintiff's injury is complete and he or
she is entitled to bring suit. Raftery v. Vick Constr. Co, 291 N.C. 180, 183-84, 230 S.E.2d 405, 407
(1976). Although the plaintiff's right to institute an action generally arises when the injury is com-
plete, the statute of limitations could be tolled until some later date under the discovery rule. See
infra note 70.
29. See Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902) (stating that "all statutes of limitation must
proceed on the idea that the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the courts");
Oole v. Oosting, 82 Mich. App. 291, 297, 266 N.W.2d 795, 799 (1978) (observing that a "statute of
limitation is one which requires a person who has a cause of action to bring suit within a specified
period of time"), aff'd sub. nom., O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980);
Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143, 146 (Okla. 1977) (holding that a
"true statute of limitations works on the remedy rather than the right and governs the time within
which a legal proceeding must be instituted after a cause of action accrues").
30. Because a statute of repose may serve a dual function-substantive and procedural-it has
also been referred to as a "hybrid statute of limitation." See, eg., Terry v. New Mexico State Hwy.
Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 645 P.2d 1375 (1982); Smith v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 38 N.C. App. 457, 254 S.E.2d 33 (1978). For convenience, however, this Note will use the
term "statute of repose" to describe laws such as § 1-50(6) that run independently of accrual of a
cause of action.
31. See Terry v. New Mexico State Hwy. Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 121, 645 P.2d 1375, 1377
(1978).
32. It is still unclear whether § 1-50(6) is constitutional in all cases in which it serves a proce-
dural function. The court in Tetterton only upheld the statute as a substantive element of accrual of
a cause of action. See infra notes 111-28 and accompanying text.
33. Several courts have recognized that statutes of repose are designed solely for the benefit of
potential defendants. This fact alone, however, does not usually affect the statute's constitutionality
despite the impact on plaintiffs whose actions may be completely barred. See Wayne v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 404 (5th Cir. 1984) ('IT]he very purpose of a statute of repose is to
create a settled time when such losses can no longer be subject to claims. Ample authority estab-
1986]
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statutes of repose shield a defendant from liability after a certain time and pre-
vent the prosecution of claims after evidence is likely to be unreliable. 34 At least
two additional arguments have been made to justify products liability statutes of
repose. First, some courts and observers have argued that greater predictability
of liability losses will result in lower prices for consumers and lower insurance
rates for manufacturers. 35 Second, manufacturers cite the special legal problems
involved in disproving the existence of a "defect" after a considerable passage of
time. Statutes of repose avoid the possibility that a jury will find older products
to be defective in a modem background rather than in the context of technology
at the time of the product's manufacture.3 6
Several arguments have been made in opposition to products liability stat-
utes of repose. First, some courts have simply rejected the justifications given
for the statute.37 Second, some courts and observers have expressed a fear that
manufacturers put less emphasis on safety when sheltered with the protection of
a statute of repose.38 Third, and most important, because statutes of repose may
completely bar recovery for otherwise compensable injuries, some courts and
lishes a governmental right to do this even though harsh results can occur under any such arbitrary
time limit."); Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306 (1974); Howell &
Graves, Inc. v. Curry, 242 Ala. 122, 5 So. 2d 105 (1941); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61
N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972).
34. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 54, 332 S.E.2d at 73. Courts reviewing the constitutionality of stat-
utes of repose invariably list these two justifications as their primary purpose. See, e.g., Wayne v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 404 (5th Cir. 1984); Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d
276, 281 (7th Cir. 1983); Hargraves v. Brackett Stripping Mach. Co., 317 F. Supp. 676, 682-83 (E.D.
Tenn. 1970).
35. Scalf v. Berkel, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that products
liability statute of repose is aimed at "skyrocketing product liability insurance costs fueled by huge
increases in the number of product liability claims, large increases in the amounts of settlements and
awards, and indications that the victim of an allegedly defective product was favored over the maker
of that product in the tort process"); McGovern, supra note I, at 594; Note, supra note 10, at 1056;
see also supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing the existence of an alleged crisis in insur-
ance rates due to increasing liability of manufacturers).
36. See McGovern, supra note 1, at 589; Note, supra note 10, at 1056.
37. For example, some courts and observers have persuasively criticized the contention that
defendant manufacturers cannot disprove liability several years after manufacture. They have
pointed out that proof related problems fall hardest on plaintiffs who bear the burden of proof. See,
e-g., Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. 1979); Note, supra note 10, at 1056-
57.
Under an equal protection analysis, see infra notes 40-67, simply rejecting the proposed justifi-
cation given for the products liability statute of repose may be a sufficient reason for striking the
statute down as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, Inc., 416 So. 2d
996 (Ala. 1982) (striking down products liability statute of repose because it lacked sufficient relation
to the legislative intention to reduce insurance rates); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512,
464 A.2d 288 (1983) (striking down products liability statute of repose because it does not decrease
liability insurance rates); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (finding products
liability statute of repose could not decrease liability insurance rates in the state).
38. See, eg., Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 200 (R.I. 1984) (striking down
statute as unconstitutional and noting that manufacturers might conclude it is "more economical to
allow the product to stay in the field of commerce until the ten-year bar applies than to correct the
defect"); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985) (The court noted that the
state's six-year statute of repose was "likely to produce an incentive for manufacturers not to take
adequate safety precautions in the manufacture and design of products having a useful life of more
than six years, thereby increasing the already substantial number of persons who have been injured




commentators have viewed them as too intrusive on the right of injured parties
to compensation. 39
Plaintiff in Tetterton began her attack on section 1-50(6) by arguing that the
statute violated the equal protection clauses of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion 4° and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.4 1 She
asserted that the statute "impermissibly distinguishes between manufacturers
and suppliers as sellers of products who are protected from liability beyond the
specific six-year period and retail businesses and private individuals as sellers of
the identical products who are not granted the same protections." 4 2
The court in Tetterton found no equal protection violation because it inter-
preted the statute as applying equally to products liability actions against both
manufacturers and retailers. The court found that the Products Liability Act, of
which section 1-50(6) is a part,4 3 was explicitly intended to apply to actions
against manufacturers and retailers.44 Because both classifications received the
protection of the statute under the court's interpretation, there was no equal
protection violation.45
The question that the Tetterton court did not directly address is whether
39. See, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 525, 464 A.2d 288, 295-96 (1983)
(characterizing barring a cause of action before it arises as "the 'Alice in Wonderland' effect" of a
statute of repose because only in Alice in Wonderland does an end occur before its cause); Wilkinson
v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 238, 243 A.2d 745, 753 (1968) (holding that "[t]o require a man to seek
a remedy before he knows of his rights, is palpably unjust"); Phillips, supra note 2, at 665-66; Note,
supra note 10, at 1056.
Two factors often present in products liability actions intensify some courts' objections to stat-
utes of repose. First, plaintiffs often may not be aware of when the product in question was first
purchased for consumption. They may assume they have the entire statute of limitation period in
which to bring suit when in fact the statute of repose may bar any suit soon after accrual. See
Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984) (statute unconstitutional when plain-
tiff, unaware of the product's original purchase date, assumed three-year statute of limitation period
applied but statute of repose barred action in one year).
Second and more important, plaintiffs' injuries may not manifest themselves until after the stat-
ute of repose period has run. The perceived injustice of a statute of repose is most evident in these
cases of delayed manifestation diseases. An action may be barred simply because the injuries caused
by a defective product do not become readily evident. See, e.g., Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd.,
723 F.2d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1983) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (characterizing a bar to a plaintiff's action
before discovery of injuries is possible as "a mockery ofjustice"), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1231 (1984);
Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 523-24, 464 A.2d 288, 294-95 (1983); Kennedy v.
Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 198 (R.I. 1984); see also infra notes 68-73 and accompanying
text (arguing that courts are more likely to find products liability statutes of repose unconstitutional
as applied to plaintiffs with delayed manifestation diseases).
40. "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws ...." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
41. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws ...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
42. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 49-50, 332 S.E.2d at 70.
43. See supra note 3.
44. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 50, 332 S.E.2d at 70-71. The court noted that a" '[p]roduct liability
action' includes any action brought for or on account of personal injury, death or property damage
caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formulation, development of
standards, preparation, processing, assembly, testing, listing, certifying, warning, instructing, mar-
keting, selling, advertising, packaging or labeling of any product." Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 99B-1(3) (1985)).
45. Equal protection is violated only if a law arbitrarily grants protection to one class of persons
while denying such protection to another class. Without a statutorily created classification, no equal
protection violation is possible. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct.
3249, 3254 (1985).
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section 1-50(6) would be upheld if attacked on other equal protection grounds.
For example, similar statutes of repose have been challenged on the ground that
they create an impermissible distinction between manufacturers of durable and
nondurable goods 46 or between plaintiffs injured before and plaintiffs injured
after the statutory period.4 7 The statute clearly creates these classifications;
therefore, courts could not dispose of these issues by finding, as the supreme
court did in Tetterton, that no classification was created.4 8
The clear implication of the Tetterton decision, however, is that the court
would uphold the statute under such challenges. The court established a diffi-
cult standard of review for a plaintiff challenging section 1-50(6).49 The court
recognized that "there is a strong presumption that an enactment of the legisla-
ture is constitutional. '50 Thus, any doubt about the statute's validity, the court
held, should be resolved in favor of the statute.5 1 Although a few courts appear
46. Manufacturers of nondurable goods get little if any protection from products liability stat-
utes of repose because their products usually cause injury, if at all, during the first few years after
sale. Durable goods, on the other hand, may be expected to cause injury many years after sale
because by definition they have a longer useful life. See Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 276,
280 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d
996, 1004 (Ala. 1982) (Torbert, C. J., concurring).
47. Because courts generally recognize that finality in legal affairs is a legitimate legislative
purpose, see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text, this classification can probably survive an
attack on equal protection grounds. It would only violate equal protection of the law, if at all, under
the more demanding middle level approach adopted by some courts. See Dworkin, supra note 1, at
55. For a discussion of review standards applied by courts in equal protection attacks on statutes of
repose, see infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
48. A common problem when a plaintiff attacks a statute of repose on the ground that it arbi-
trarily distinguishes between potential classes of defendants is standing. To have standing to attack a
statute's constitutionality in federal court, a party must have so concrete an interest in the outcome
of the suit that he or she has suffered an "injury in fact." See McClanahan v. American Gilsonite
Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1342 (D. Colo. 1980). A party generally does not have standing to assert the
constitutional rights of third persons. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-16 (1976). State courts
may also invoke the standing principle to avoid addressing a constitutional challenge to a statute.
See, eg., Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 121, 645 P.2d 1375, 1377
(1982).
Courts are split on whether plaintiffs have standing to attack a statute of repose on the ground
that it impermissibly distinguishes between potential classes of defendants. Standing was denied in
Adair v. Koppers Co., 541 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 741 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1982); McCarty
v. Goldstein, 151 Colo. 154, 376 P.2d 691 (1962); Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n, 98
N.M. 119, 645 P.2d 1375 (1982). However, standing was found in McClanahan v. American Gilson-
ite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Colo. 1980) and in Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514
(1982).
The majority of courts seem to decide the standing issue on the basis of whether they want to
address the constitutional question raised. For courts not wishing to rule on the equal protection
status of a statute of repose, standing is often a convenient theory. Many courts raise the standing
issue but then fail to resolve it, apparently intent on upholding or striking down the statute. See, e.g.,
Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504, 511 (8th Cir. 1983). As Tetterton
illustrates, some courts do not address the standing question either because it was not raised or
because they want to address the constitutional issue in spite of any standing problems.
49. The North Carolina Supreme Court has traditionally applied a very high standard of review
to constitutional challenges to state statutes. See, e.g., Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 308 N.C. 419,
433, 302 S.E.2d 868, 876 (1983); A-S-P Assoc. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 214, 258 SE.2d 444,
449 (1979); Painter v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 288 N.C. 165, 177, 217 S.E.2d 650, 658 (1975);
Wilson v. City of High Point, 238 N.C. 14, 23, 76 S.E.2d 546, 552 (1953).




to be more active in reviewing statutes of repose,5 2 a majority of courts impose a
standard of review similar to that set forth in Tetterton.53
Courts generally use one of two levels of analysis for reviewing an equal
protection challenge to products liability statutes of repose.54 The most com-
monly used standard is the two-part rational basis test.5 5 This test requires that
the legislative purpose56 behind the statute be "rational" and that the classifica-
tion used to achieve this purpose bear a reasonable relation to the legislative
objective.5 7 A few courts, however, have applied a more demanding middle tier
52. See, e.g., Davgaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply Assoc., 349 N.W.2d 419, 425 (S.D. 1984)
(holding that "[o]ur constitution ... is solid core upon which all our state laws must be premised").
53. See, eg., Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 955 (4th Cir. 1984); Braswell v. Flintkote
Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 467 U.S. 1231 (1984); Klein v. Catalano,
386 Mass. 701,437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr., Inc., 402 So.
2d 320 (Miss. 1981); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976).
54. No court has applied the highest level of equal protection analysis, sttict scrutiny, to a
statute of repose. Strict scrutiny is limited to cases involving a suspect classification or a classifica-
tion infringing on a fundamental right such as speech, voting, or interstate travel. Strict scrutiny is
not used for reviewing economic regulations. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Boil-
ing v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); see also Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d
1381 (La. 1978) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to a statute of repose when no fundamental right or
suspect classification was involved).
55. Because courts often use language imprecisely, it may be unclear what test a court is apply-
ing. For example, builder's statutes of repose have been upheld under a rational basis test. See, e.g.,
Cudahy Co. v. Ragnar Benson, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1981); Carter v. Hartenstein, 248
Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
21 Cal. 3d 624, 581 P.2d 197, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1978); Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 133 Cal. App.
3d 171, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1982); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982); Ches-
wold Volunteer Fire Dept. v. Lambertson Constr. Co., 489 A.2d 413 (Del. 1984); Whiting-Turner
Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340, 499 A.2d 178 (1985); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701,
437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980); Reeves v.
Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J.
190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977); Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868
(1983); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978); Yakima
Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108
(1972).
Builder's statutes of repose have been struck down under the rational basis test by other courts.
See, e.g., McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Colo. 1980); Fujioka v.
Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967);
Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 194 Minn. 97, 260 N.W.2d 548 (1977); Loyal Order
of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241
S.E.2d 739 (1978); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).
Products liability statutes of repose have been upheld under the rational basis test in Braswell v.
Flintkote Mines, Ltd. 723 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1231 (1984); Van Den Hul
v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1983); Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d
276 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983); Groth v. Sandoz, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 453 (D. Neb.
1984); Kline v. J.I. Case Co., 520 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Scalf v. Berkel, Inc., 448 N.E.2d
1201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
Products liability statutes of repose have been struck down under a rational basis in Lankford v.
Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d
195 (R.I. 1984).
56. One of the primary purposes behind the adoption of products liability statutes of repose is
to increase the availability of liability insurance at affordable rates. See supra notes 1-2, 35 and
accompanying text.
57. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 1074 (1981); United States Dept. of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Responsible Citizens in Opposition to the Flood Plan Ordinance v.
City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 302 S.E.2d 204 (1983); Guthrie v. Taylor, 279 N.C. 703, 185 S.E.2d
193 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972); Pangburn v. Saad, 73 N.C. App. 336, 326 S.E.2d 365
(1985).
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of analysis58 to statutes of repose because of the importance of the right to com-
pensation for injuries.59 This standard of review requires a nonarbitrary classifi-
cation that bears a fair and substantial relation to the achievement of a
reasonable legislative purpose. 60
The Tetterton opinion indicates that the supreme court will apply the more
lenient rational basis test to review any classification created by section 1-50(6).
As the court stated: "The General Assembly is the policy-making agency of our
government, and when it elects to legislate in respect to the subject matter of any
common-law rule, the statute supplants the common-law rule and becomes the
public policy of the State in respect to that particular matter." 61 This deference
to the legislative judgment is characteristic of the rational basis test and indicates
that the court will uphold section 1-50(6) if challenged on equal protection
grounds.62
58. The middle tier approach allows greater judicial review of the legislative ends sought by the
classification. For example, middle tier review should allow a court to review whether a legislature
had reasonable grounds to believe that an insurance "crisis" existed in the products liability field in
the mid-1970s, see supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text, and whether the statute of repose was
substantially related to easing the crisis. Because this alleged crisis is the main justification for the
passage of products liability statutes of repose, a court can invalidate the law if it concludes that the
crisis never existed or no longer exists. See Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 526, 464
A.2d 288, 296 (1983).
Courts have struck down builder's statutes of repose under a middle tier equal protection analy-
sis. See, eg., Henderson Clay Prod., Inc. v. Edgar Wood & Assoc., 122 N.H. 800, 451 A.2d 174
(1982).
The sole case in which a court applied a middle tier of scrutiny to a products liability statute of
repose appears to be Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983); see also
Dworkin, supra note 1, at 57-58 (arguing that a middle tier approach is appropriate for reviewing
products liability statutes of repose).
59. Courts are in complete agreement that the right to compensation for injuries is not a funda-
mental right that would lead to strict scrutiny analysis. See supra note 54. For this reason, most
courts conclude that the rational basis test is appropriate. See, e.g., Wayne v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 404 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 908 (1985); Scalf v. Berkel, Inc.,
448 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md.
340, 352, 499 A.2d 178, 185 (1985). Those few courts that apply a middle tier of scrutiny generally
reason that although the right to compensation is not a fundamental right, it is an important interest
that should receive more protection than review for mere rationality. See, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 524-25, 464 A.2d 288, 295 (1983); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931-
32, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980) (holding the right to recover for personal injuries to be "an important
substantive right" requiring a middle tier equal protection approach).
60. See, eg., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980). The United States
Supreme Court has generally limited the middle tier approach to classifications based on gender,
illegitimacy, and occassionally, alienage. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259 (1979); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). State courts, however, are free to extend the middle
tier analysis to other classifications based on state constitutional guarantees of equal protection. See,
e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (extending the middle tier approach to
review of statute limiting medical malpractice actions).
61. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 59, 332 S.E.2d at 75 (quoting Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308
N.C. 419, 444, 302 S.E.2d 868, 882 (1983)).
62. The rational basis test is a minimal level of review under which most statutes are upheld.
For example, some courts merely ask whether any "conceivable legitimate government interest" for
a classification can be found. Pangburn v. Saad, 73 N.C. App. 336, 340, 326 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1985).
Under this approach, so long as "the legislature could reasonably conceive to be true the facts on
which the challenged legislative classifications are based," the statute will be upheld. Carson v.
Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 933, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980). In borderline cases the statute generally
prevails. Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp,, 308 N.C. 419, 435, 302 S.E.2d 868, 877 (1983).
Some courts nevertheless have found that products liability statutes of repose do not meet the
rational basis requirement. In Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984), for
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The court cited with approval several cases in which courts have considered
equal protection challenges to products liability statutes of repose under a ra-
tional basis test and rejected those challenges.63 In addition, the court cited with
strong approval its previous decision in Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp. 64 The
court in Lamb upheld the North Carolina builder's statute of repose65 against an
equal protection attack, after applying a rational basis test.66
There is one important area in which the court could be persuaded to apply
a higher level of scrutiny than mere rationality. When injury from a product is a
delayed manifestation disease, 67 the unfairness of section 1-50(6) is clear.68 A
plaintiff may be denied recovery simply because he or she did not become aware
of an injury until more than six years from the date of the product's sale. Analo-
example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the statute arbitrarily singled out plain-
tiffs injured by manufactured products and created special legislation for manufacturers. Id. at 198-
99. In Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982), the Alabama Supreme
Court found a products liability statute of repose arbitrary for treating durable and nondurable
goods in an identical manner. Id. at 1002-03. The court in Tetterton acknowledged the decisions in
Kennedy and Lankford, but stated that it did not find the reasoning persuasive. Tetterton, 314 N.C.
at 58, 332 S.E.2d at 75.
63. For example, the court cited with approval Scalfv. Berkel, 448 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983), in which the Indiana court used "a rational relationship test... [and] concluded that the
limitation period was reasonably related to the purpose of the statute." Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 57,
332 S.E.2d at 74.
64. 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983).
65. The statute provided that
[n]o action to recover damages based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condi-
tion of an improvement to real property shall be brought more than six years from the later
of the specific last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action or
substantial completion of the improvement.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (1983). Analogous statutes have been passed in the majority ofjurisdic-
tions. See generally Comment, Limitation ofAction Statutes for Architects and Builders-Blueprints
for Non-Action, 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 361 (1969) (detailing the development, provisions, and consti-
tutionality of builder's statutes of repose).
66. Lamb, 308 N.C. at 434-38, 302 S.E.2d at 877-79. Adjudication of the constitutionality of
products liability statutes of repose is still in an early stage. Decisions on the constitutional validity
of builder's statutes of repose are numerous, however, because these statutes generally predate prod-
ucts liability statutes of repose by at least 10 to 20 years. In addition, the constitutional attacks are
similar for both types of statutes because they function in the same manner. Several courts and
observers have therefore relied heavily on past constitutional decisions on builder's statutes of repose
to judge attacks on products liability statutes of repose. In addition to Tetterton, see Barwick v.
Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984); Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla.
1981), overruled on other grounds, Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985); Davis v.
Mobilift Equip. Co., 70 N.C. App. 621, 622, 320 S.E.2d 406, 407 (1984) (holding that both § 1-50(5)
and § 1-50(6) "are statutes of repose, and no rational basis appears for treating them differently with
respect to the issues presented"), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 328, 329 S.E.2d 385 (1985); Tetterton, 67
N.C. App. at 631, 313 S.E.2d at 251 (Becton, J., concurring) (although Judge Becton believes § 1-
50(6) is unconstitutional, he voted in favor of its constitutionality because of a state supreme court
decision on the constitutionality of a builder's statute of repose); McGovern, supra note 1, at 582;
Note, supra note 10, at 1050-54.
67. A common example of a delayed manifestation disease caused by a manufactured product is
asbestosis, which may manifest itself decades after initial exposure. See, e.g., Wilder v. Amatex
Corp., 314 N.C. 550, 336 S.E.2d 66 (1985) (plaintiff's first exposure was in 1938, but asbestosis was
not diagnosed until 1979).
68. The arguments against statutes of repose are so much more persuasive in this context that
the court may also apply a heightened standard of review under other constitutional provisions such
as the state constitutional guarantee of open access to courts. See infra note 106 and accompanying
text.
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gizing the situation to adoption of the discovery rule,69 many courts have been
willing to strike down products liability statutes of repose in delayed manifesta-
tion disease cases. 70 Although there is no direct North Carolina precedent on
the subject, 71 Tetterton could have been decided differently had plaintiff's suit
been barred due to failure to discover an injury within the six-year period. 72
The second constitutional attack on section 1-50(6) in Tetterton was based
on the "exclusive emoluments" clause of the state constitution, 73 which prevents
individuals or classes from receiving special privileges from the state.74 As with
her equal protection claim, plaintiff argued that section 1-50 (6) conferred a priv-
ilege on a class because it arbitrarily limited the liability of manufacturers but
69. Under the common law a cause of action accrued at the time of injury. Application of this
rule operated unjustly in many medical malpractice cases. Plaintiffs' claims were barred simply
because they did not learn of their injuries until the statute of limitations period had passed. Courts
and legislatures in most jurisdictions responded by adopting the discovery rule. The discovery rule
modifies the common law and holds that a cause of action accrues at the time an injury is discovered
or reasonably should have been discovered. See Dworkin, supra note 1, at 37-40.
70. In some products liability cases, courts have analogized the statute of repose barring plain-
tiffs who have not yet discovered their injury to the inequitable situation existing before adoption of
the discovery rule. Compare Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 525, 464 A.2d 288, 295
(1983) (holding that "[t]he twelve year [product liability statute of repose] is unreasonable because
the mere purchase [of some products] does not place the consumer on notice of a hidden defect
injurious to his health or safety") with Braswell v. Flintkote Mines, Ltd., 723 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.
1983) (upholding a products liability statute of repose despite the fact it may operate as a complete
bar to recovery for plaintiffs who have an injury that is not yet manifested), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1231 (1984).
71. In Wilder v. Amatex Corp., 314 N.C. 550, 336 S.E.2d 66 (1985), the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff with a delayed manifestation disease was not barred by the
statute of repose in § 1-15(b), the predecessor of § 1-52(16). Id. at 562, 336 S.E.2d at 73. Rather
than rule on the constitutionality of § 1-15(b), however, the court held that the statute did not apply
to claims of delayed manifestation diseases. It would be difficult for the court to apply this same
analysis to § 1-50(6), which purports to apply to any action based on a products liability theory. See
supra note 9; Note, supra note 7, at 422-23; see also Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.
1984) (upholding § 1-15(b) as constitutional when applied to a plaintiffwith a delayed manifestation
disease).
Should the court find § 1-50(6) constitutional as applied to plaintiffs with delayed manifestation
diseases, legislative action to exempt these plaintiffs from operation of the statute would be war-
ranted. See Note, supra note 7, at 415. A few states do exempt the claims of plaintiffs with delayed
manifestation diseases from their products liability statute of repose. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-
1303(2)(b)(1) (Supp. 1985).
72. In light of the court's refusal to address the constitutional issue in Wilder v. Amatex Corp.,
314 N.C. 550, 336 S.E.2d 66 (1985), see supra note 71, such a holding is probably unlikely despite the
equitable appeal it would have. This possibility is suggested, however, by some commentators,
Note, supra note 7, at 430; see also Dworkin, supra note 1, at 56 (suggesting that constitutional
arguments against products liability statutes of repose are much stronger in cases of delayed manifes-
tation disease).
73. "No person ... is entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the com-
munity but in consideration of public service." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32.
74. The constitutional standard of review under the "exclusive emoluments" clause is closely
related to the rational basis equal protection standard. The statute in question will be upheld so long
as the general assembly reasonably could have assumed that the law promotes the general welfare.
Lamb, 308 N.C. at 439, 302 S.E.2d at 879; State v. Knight, 269 N.C. 100, 108, 152 S.E.2d 179, 184
(1967). The law is unconstitutional, however, if no reasonable aspect of the public welfare is pro-
moted and the statute confers a special benefit on a particular class of persons. See State v. Harris,
216 N.C. 746, 753-55, 6 S.E.2d 854, 858-60 (1939) (statute excluding dry cleaners in several counties
from licensing requirements held unconstitutional).
The court in Tetterton did not have to apply this standard because it found that no special
benefit was conferred by § 1-50(6). The court, however, did indicate that it viewed the statute to be
in the public interest. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 53, 332 S.E.2d at 72.
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not the liability of distributors.75 The court held that because the statute applied
equally to manufacturers and retailers of products,76 it conferred no special priv-
ilege on manufacturers. 77
Plaintiff in Tetterton also claimed that section 1-50(6) violated the "open
courts" provision of the North Carolina Constitution. 78 Article I, section 18 of
the state constitution provides that "[a]ll courts shall be open; every person for
an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy
by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor,
denial, or delay."' 79 Plaintiff alleged that section 1-50(6) barred her claim for her
husband's death before the death occurred and thus denied her a remedy for an
injury done.80
Statutes of repose have been challenged frequently under the "open courts"
provisions of state constitutions.81 Courts generally have taken one of three
views when confronted with an "open courts" challenge. A majority of courts
give very little weight to the constitutional guarantee of open access to courts. 82
These courts generally view the constitutional provision as a mandate to the
courts rather than a limitation on the legislature.83 To the extent that the guar-
75. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 52-53, 332 S.E.2d at 72.
76. Id. at 50, 332 S.E.2d at 70-71; see supra note 44; text accompanying notes 43-44.
77. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 49-52, 332 S.E.2d at 70-71.
78. Id. at 53, 332 S.E.2d at 72.
79. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 18.
80. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 53, 332 S.E.2d at 72.
81. Thirty-seven states have some form of open access to state courts guarantee in their consti-
tutions. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334, 350 (Ala. 1980) (Shores, J.,
concurring).
Courts have upheld builder's statutes of repose under open access to courts attacks in the fol-
lowing cases: Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982); Cheswold Volunteer Fire
Co. v. Lambertson Constr. Co., 489 A.2d 413 (Del. 1984); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437
N.E.2d 514 (1982); Anderson v. Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr., Inc., 402 So. 2d 320 (Miss.
1981); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); Lamb, 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d
868; Joseph v. Bums, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971); and Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong
Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978).
Courts have struck down builder's statutes of repose as violating state constitutional guarantees
of open access to courts in Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1983);
Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d I (Fla.
1973); and Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1981).
Courts have upheld products liability statutes of repose under open access to courts attacks in
Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1983); Pullum v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985); Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207
(1981); and Tetterton, 314 N.C. 44, 332 S.E.2d 67.
Courts have struck down products liability statutes of repose as violating constitutional guaran-
tees of open access to state courts in Ellison v. Northwest Eng'g Co., 521 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla.
1981); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Diamond v. E.R. Squibb
& Sons, 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981), overruled by, Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla.
1985); Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984); Davgaard v. Baltic Coop.
Bldg. Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984); and Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670
(Utah 1985).
82. Predictably, all courts taking this limited view of the constitutional provision have held that
the statute of repose is valid. See infra note 85.
83. See Harmon v. Angus R. Jessup Assoc., 619 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tenn. 1981); Harrison v.
Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tenn. 1978) (holding that the state constitutional guarantee of open
access to courts is "a mandate to the judiciary and not... a limitation upon the legislature"). In
effect, courts applying this low standard of review "have all but read those constitutional provisions
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antee is held to limit legislative actions, it gives no more protection than does the
constitutional provision for due process of law.84 The legislature has complete
discretion to modify or abolish common-law causes of action without providing
an alternative remedy. 5 Only when the statute of repose infringes on vested
rights86 without providing an equivalent remedy have these courts held that the
"open courts" guarantee may be violated.87 For example, if a plaintiff is injured
on May 28, and a statute of repose bars his or her action on May 30, a court
might find a violation of the "open courts" provision even under this minimal
test.88
Some courts apply an intermediate level of review, allowing the legislature
great flexibility in modifying common-law remedies but requiring that modifica-
out of their respective constitutions, at least insofar as they provide substantive, as opposed to proce-
dural, protections." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 678 (Utah 1985).
84. Due process provides little protection for plaintiffs deprived of nonvested rights. See infra
notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
85. The legislature generally has complete discretion to define what constitutes a recognized
legal cause of action. Furthermore, the constitutional guarantee of open access assures access to the
courts only to those plaintiffs who have a recognized cause of action. A plaintiff who cannot meet
the requirements of the statute of repose does not have a recognized legal action and may be consti-
tutionally denied a remedy for his or her injuries. Courts often cite the following passage from Silver
v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929): "The Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or
the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible purpose." See
Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984); Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator
Co., 716 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1983); Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725 (Ala.
1983); Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson Constr. Co., 489 A.2d 413 (Del. 1984); Klein v.
Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982) (upholding legislature's complete discretion to
define causes of action in order to respond to changing social circumstances); Anderson v. Fred
Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr., Inc., 402 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 1981); Lamb, 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d
868; Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 281, 382 A.2d 715, 721 (1978)
(stating that "[t]his Court would encroach upon the Legislature's ability to guide the development of
the law if we invalidated legislation simply because the rule enacted by the Legislature rejects some
cause of action currently preferred by the courts").
86. A right generally vests only when an actionable injury occurs. See Walters v. Blackledge,
220 Miss. 485, 518, 71 So. 2d 433, 446 (1954) ("there is no vested right in any remedy for torts yet to
happen, and except as to vested rights the legislature has full power to change or abolish existing
common law remedies and methods of procedures"); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 110,
551 P.2d 647, 651 (1976) ("no one has a vested right in any rule of the common law").
87. See Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982); Dunn v. Felt, 379 A.2d 1140
(Del. Super. Ct. 1977), aff'd sub. nom., Dunn v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 401 A.2d 77 (Del, 1979);
Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207 (1981); Anderson v. Fred Wagner &
Roy Anderson, Jr., Inc., 402 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 1981); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551
P.2d 647 (1976); Pangburn v. Saad, 73 N.C. App. 336, 326 S.E.2d 365 (1985); Loyal Order of
Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavanass, 563 P.2d 143, 146 (Okla. 1977).
88. Courts that find a violation of the open courts guarantee when vested rights are infringed
upon generally do so in dicta. In these cases, the statutes do not in fact alter vested rights. See cases
cited supra note 87.
A statute of repose that affects vested rights functions procedurally rather than substantively.
See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. Not all statutes of repose that procedurally infringe
upon vested rights are unconstitutional. For example, a plaintiff who has two years after accrual in
which to bring suit under a statute of repose has not been unconstitutionally deprived of a vested
right. The proper standard of review in such a circumstance is the due process test of reasonableness
rather than an open courts analysis. So long as plaintiffs have a reasonable time in which to enforce
their vested rights, the statute of repose is constitutional. See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying
text. The open courts guarantee does not appear to add to this protection. Courts' statements in
dicta that the open courts guarantee may be violated if vested rights are infringed upon are thus




tions provide a meaningful opportunity for redress of injury.89 The South Da-
kota Supreme Court in applying this standard of review concluded that the open
access provision of the state constitution should not be merely "a faint echo to
be skirted or ignored." 90 Rather, the court held that even if the statute of repose
does not affect vested rights, it is unconstitutional if it arbitrarily extinguishes
previously recognized legal rights.9 1 Under this approach a statute of repose
that functions as an absolute bar92 to a plaintiff's recovery is invalid.9
3
The courts in Florida, 94 Alabama, 95 and Utah,96 apply the highest standard
89. A leading case adopting this view is Davgaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply Ass'n, 349
N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984). The constitutional provision at issue in Davgaard was very similar to the
North Carolina guarantee: "All courts shall be open, and every man for an injury done him in his
property, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice, admin-
istered without denial or delay." S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20. The South Dakota Supreme Court
found that South Dakota's six-year products liability statute of repose clearly violated this constitu-
tional guarantee because it arbitrarily and completely extinguished the plaintiff's right to recovery
for otherwise compensable injuries. Davgaard, 349 N.W.2d at 425-27.
90. Davgaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply Assoc., 349 N.W.2d 419, 425 (S.D. 1984).
91. Id. at 424-25.
92. A statute of repose does not always function as an absolute substantive bar to recovery.
Rather, when a cause of action accrues before the statutory period has passed, a statute of repose
may function procedurally to limit the time in which a plaintiff may bring suit. See supra notes 30-
32 and accompanying text. In this instance, courts generally uphold application of the statute as
constitutional so long as the plaintiff is provided a reasonable time in which to sue. See infra notes
117-28 and accompanying text.
93. To these courts the objectionable characteristic of a products liability statute of repose is
that it can function to bar some actions completely. See Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471
A.2d 195, 198, 200 (R.I. 1984) ('The total denial of access to the courts for adjudication of a [prod-
ucts liability] claim even before it arises, however, most certainly 'flies in the face of the constitu-
tional command"' of open access to courts, and "[ilt would be manifestly unjust and inconsistent
with [the open access guarantee] to bar plaintiff's right to access to the courts absolutely."); Dav-
gaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply Assoc., 349 N.W.2d 419, 424-25 (S.D. 1984) (finding that a six-
year products liability statute of repose "unconstitutionally locked the courtroom door before appel-
lants had an opportunity to open it" and that the statute is "a locked deadbolt and shackle on our
courtroom doors").
94. The Florida Constitution provides that "[tihe courts shall be open to every person for re-
dress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay." FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 21. Due to the Florida Supreme Court's recent decision in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476
So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985), however, the state of the law in Florida is unclear. In Overland Constr. Co.
v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the Florida builder's
statute of repose violated the constitutional guarantee of open access to courts. The court applied
the high standard of review discussed infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. In Battillia v. Allis
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980), overruled by, Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d
657 (Fla. 1985), the court, citing Overland, also struck down the state's twelve-year products liability
statute of repose. In Pullum, however, the court overruled Battillia with little analysis other than to
state that the products liability statute of repose was reasonable and therefore did not violate the
open courts guarantee. Pullum, 476 So. 2d at 659. The court in Pullum, however, purported not to
reverse the Overland decision. Id. at 659-60. It is therefore unclear what standard the Florida
Supreme Court would apply to a statute challenged under the state constitutional guarantee of open
access. Pullum is a short decision that appears to adopt the minimum standard of reasonableness.
At the same time, the Pullum decision upholds the Overland case that applied a stringent standard of
review.
95. The Alabama Constitution provides "[t]hat all courts shall be open; and that every person,
for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due
process of law; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay." ALA.
CONST. art. I, § 13.
96. The Utah Constitution provides that
[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, prop-
erty, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
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of review to statutes of repose under open access guarantees. Although courts in
these states claim to presume the statute constitutional, they give the constitu-
tional guarantee of open courts a great deal of weight.9 7 Under this heightened
scrutiny, a statute of repose unconstitutionally deprives plaintiffs of nonvested
rights9" unless there is "an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of
such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be
shown."9 9
The court in Tetterton upheld section 1-50(6) under the open access guaran-
tee of the North Carolina Constitution. Rather than analyzing its rejection of
plaintiff's constitutional attack in Tetterton, the court simply cited its earlier
Lamb decision, in which it had rejected an identical challenge to the six-year
builder's statute of repose in North Carolina.1co The court in Lamb reasoned:
We are confident that this condition to the legal cognizability of a
claim does not violate the constitutional guarantee that for every "in-
jury done" there shall be a "remedy." The "remedy" constitutionally
guaranteed "for an injury done" is qualified by the words "by due
course of law." This means that the remedy constitutionally guaran-
teed must be one that is legally cognizable. The legislature has the
power to define the circumstances under which a remedy is legally cog-
nizable and those under which it is not.101
The court in Lamb thus expressly adopted the majority view that the open ac-
cess guarantee requires only minimal review of a statute of repose and that the
general assembly has great flexibility to modify nonvested rights.102
defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel any civil cause to which
he is a party.
UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 11.
97. See, eg., Fireman's Fund Amer. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334, 350-51 (Ala. 1980)
(Shores, J., concurring) (The constitutional guarantee of open access to courts "is among the most
fundamental of the guarantees against governmental oppression embodied in our state constitution
.... [lit can generally be said to incorporate into our constitution a fundamental principle of fair-
ness, a perhaps vaguely conceived but important notion of limitation on the power of government to
infringe on individual rights, and to act arbitrarily."); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670,
675 (Utah 1985) (The open access to courts guarantee "is based on fairness and equality" and pro-
tects "basic individual rights.").
98. Even courts applying the minimum standard of review agree that a statute of repose cannot
infringe upon vested rights without implicating the constitutional guarantee of open access. See
supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
99. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973). For other decisions applying this standard,
see Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1980); Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981),
overruled by, Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985); Overland Constr. Co. v. Sir-
mons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).
100. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 53, 332 S.E.2d at 72.
101. Lamb, 308 N.C. at 444, 302 S.E.2d at 882.
102. Before Lamb the North Carolina Court of Appeals had imposed a higher standard of re-
view and invalidated § 1-50(6) as violating the North Carolina open courts guarantee. Bolick v.
American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified, 306 N.C. 364, 293
S.E.2d 415 (1982). The court of appeals in Bolick reasoned:
[A]rticle I, section 18 guarantees to those who suffer injury to their persons, property, or
reputation, the right to seek redress therefor in the courts of this state. Any law which
attempts to deny that right runs afoul of this guarantee. G.S. 1-50(6), because it would
absolutely abolish rights to seek redress for injuries, on its face violates article I, section 18.
Id. at 593, 284 S.E.2d at 191. The court in Bolick relied on Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E.
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The Lamb and Tetterton decisions may prove to be less restrictive than they
first appear. Because the court in Tetterton found that section 1-50(6) imposed a
minor limitation on the right to sue in products liability cases,10 3 the court ex-
pressly refused to reach the issue whether the general assembly has complete
discretion to modify or abolish common-law causes of action. 104 In Lamb the
court also specifically refused "to decide whether the legislature could constitu-
tionally abolish all tort claims against builders and designers arising out of im-
provements they built or designed" because the issue was not before the
court.10 5 Both Lamb and Tetterton are therefore carefully limited to upholding
the general assembly's authority to establish reasonable statutes of repose as con-
ditions precedent to the accrual of causes of action. These cases thus raise the
possibility that any further limitation on common-law rights of action could vio-
late the constitutional guarantee of open access to courts. 10 6
The fourth and final constitutional challenge to section 1-50(6) in Tetterton
was that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.10 7 Plaintiff argued that the
term "initial purchase for use or consumption," describing the date on which the
811 (1904) to support its reasoning. The supreme court in Osborn upheld a law eliminating punitive
damages in libel suits. The court made it clear in dicta that any limitation on actual compensatory
damages would violate the constitutional guarantee of open access to courts. Id. at 639-40, 47 S.E.
at 815. Although Osborn appears to impose an important limitation on legislative actions, the court
in Lamb found this standard inapplicable because no right was totally abolished. Lamb, 308 N.C. at
443-44, 302 S.E.2d at 882. Rather, only actions accruing more than six years after the last act of the
defendant were barred. In this circumstance, the court imposed the less stringent reasonableness
test. Id.; see also Walker v. Santos, 70 N.C. App. 623, 320 S.E.2d 407 (1984) (applying the permis-
sive test from Lamb to uphold N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983), a four-year statute of repose for
medical malpractice actions).
103. The court cited a study finding that "over 97 percent of product-related accidents occur
within six years of the time the product was purchased." Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 54, 332 S.E.2d at 73
(quoting MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LiAmiLrry ACT, § 110 analysis, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg.
62,714, at 62,733 (1979)). The reliability of this statistic, however, has been seriously questioned.
First, the quoted study is at best biased. As one observer has stated, "The results of this study
cannot be overemphasized. [It was] [i]nitiated by the insurance industry and conducted by the In-
surance Services Office, the ratemaking arm of the industry." Phillips, supra note 2, at 664 n.10.
Second, the court's contention that an overwhelming majority of injuries related to manufactured
goods occur within six years of sale is somewhat ironic because the injury in question occurred more
than six years after sale. Third, if the conclusions of the study were accurate, the statute would serve
no useful function. At the urging of the insurance industry, the general assembly adopted § 1-50(6)
to curtail plaintiffs' awards in products liability suits. The statute does not achieve this purpose if, as
the court concluded, it bars very few products liability actions.
104. The court observed that "the legislature might pass a statute of repose that had a time
period so short that it would effectively abolish all potential claims." Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 54, 332
S.E.2d at 73 (quoting Lamb, 308 N.C. at 444 n.7, 302 S.E.2d at 882 n.7).
105. Lamb, 308 N.C. at 443-44, 302 S.E.2d at 882.
106. Previous decisions of the court, however, have implied that there is an absolute legislative
right to abolish or modify existing common-law remedies. See, eg., Pinkham v. Unborn Children of
Jather Pinkham, 227 N.C. 72, 78, 40 S.E.2d 690, 694 (1946) ("No person has a vested right in a
continuance of the common or statute law.").
It is possible that the Tetterton court had in mind cases involving delayed manifestation dis-
eases. In such cases constitutional attacks on statutes of repose are generally stronger than attacks in
cases involving consumer goods. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. Indeed, the court in
Tetterton appeared to limit its analysis of the open courts provision to cases involving "durable
goods." Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 54, 332 S.E.2d at 73. The court has thus left the door open to a
finding that § 1-50(6) is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs with delayed manifestation diseases.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
107. Tetterton, 314 N.C. at 54-56, 332 S.E.2d at 73-74.
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six-year period began to run, could mean that the statutory period recommences
each time a customer repurchases a product.10 8 The court rejected this reading
of the statute as implausible for two reasons. First, the statute clearly refers only
to the "initial" purchase, which the court defined as the "first" purchase "for use
or consumption." 10 9 Second, the court found that a contrary interpretation
would be inconsistent with the intention of the general assembly that section 1-
50(6) limit the liability of manufacturers. 10
One major constitutional challenge conspicuously absent from the Tetterton
case is a challenge based on state or federal guarantees of due process of law.
Due process challenges to statutes of repose generally contend that the right to
compensation for injuries is a property right that cannot be denied without a
trial.11 I Although the Tetterton court did not address the validity of a due pro-
cess attack, implicit in the court's reasoning is a rejection of such an argument.
Courts have generally upheld statutes of repose under a due process attack
as valid exercises of legislative authority. Legislatures are generally held to have
great discretion in defining the substantive elements of a cause of action.112 A
statute of repose merely imposes an additional substantive element that plaintiffs
in a products liability action must prove in order to recover. So long as the
statute of repose does not bar all claims from accruing, it is almost universally
upheld against a due process challenge. 113 The due process standard that courts
108. Id. at 54-55, 332 S.E.2d at 73.
109. Id. at 56, 332 S.E.2d at 74.
110. Id. at 55-56, 332 S.E.2d at 73-74. Constitutional attacks on statutes of repose based on
vagueness are rarely successful. See, eg., Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb. 581, 586, 244 N.W.2d 201, 204
(1976) (holding that a statute of repose for medical malpractice actions is not unconstitutionally
vague unless "'it is so imperfect and deficient in its terms as to render it impossible of execution and
enforcement' ") (quoting Neeman v. Nebraska Natural Resources Comm'n, 191 Neb. 672, 217
N.W.2d 166 (1974)).
111. A unique due process argument was made in Scalf v. Berkel, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1983). Plaintiff challenged a products liability statute of repose in Scalf under the rule that
due process is violated if a statute denies legal rights based on facts presumed to be true without
allowing the party to prove the truth or falsity of the facts in question. Plaintiff asserted that the
statute of repose created an irrebuttable presumption "that persons injured using machines or prod-
ucts of ten years of age or more are undeserving of compensation for their injuries." Id. at 1204.
The court easily rejected plaintiff's argument by pointing out that the statute was not based on such
a presumption but rather reflected a legislative policy decision to protect manufacturers from liabil-
ity after a certain length of time. Id.
112. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
113. See, eg., Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that there is
no cause of action and no vested property right in tort claims "upon which to base a due process
challenge until the injury actually occurs," and thus, an injury "which occurs after a specified limita-
tion period, such as the discovery of cancer ... does not give rise to due process protection"); Van
Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1983); Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc.,
712 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir.) (an objection to legislative modification of nonvested causes of action "is
protected by the voting booth, not by the federal courts"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983); Adair
v. Koppers Co., 541 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd, 741 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1984); Smith v.
Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698, 701 (W.D. Va. 1974) (finding that "the legislature, in its infi-
nite wisdom may, within limits of rationality, determine what are actionable wrongs and the time
limits within which lawsuits must be brought to redress such wrongs"); Cheswold Volunteer Fire
Co. v. Lambertson Constr. Co., 489 A.2d 413, 416-18 (Del. 1984) (upholding builder's statute of
repose as a fair balance between an injured party's right to compensation and the need to limit
liability); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d 1381, 1387 (La. 1978) ("the guar-
antee of due process does not forbid the creation of new causes of action or the abolition of old ones
to attain permissible legislative objectives"); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 707-13, 437 N.E,2d
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apply is identical to the test that a majority of courts use in open access chal-
lenges. 114 The North Carolina Supreme Court thus would be likely to apply its
analysis of the "open courts" attack in Tetterton and Lamb to reject any due
process challenge to section 1-50(6)."s
There is, however, one important instance in which a due process challenge
to section 1-50(6) would have a substantial likelihood of success. Although stat-
utes of repose generally function substantively, they may at times operate as a
procedural bar to a vested cause of action. 116 This happens when a plaintiff's
action accrues near the end of the statute of repose period. In such a situation, a
plaintiff does not have the full statute of limitations period in which to file suit.
Rather, a plaintiff will be procedurally barred from bringing suit once the statute
of repose period has run.
When statutes of repose function in a procedural manner, a different due
process analysis is justified. Courts in these cases generally judge the statute by
the due process standard for procedural statutes of limitations.1 7 Due process
requires that procedural limits on the period in which a lawsuit must be brought
be reasonable. 118 When a plaintiff has a reasonable time period in which to sue,
courts have upheld the statute of repose even if it provides a shorter period than
the applicable statute of limitations would otherwise provide.1 9 If, however,
514, 519-22 (1982); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 113, 551 P.2d 647, 652 (1976) ("[t]he
Constitution does not freeze common law rights in perpetuity"); Rosenberg v. Town of North Ber-
gen, 61 N.J. 190, 199-200, 293 A.2d 662, 666-67 (1972).
114. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
115. The court in Tetterton cited with approval several cases that rejected due process challenges
to statutes of repose. For example, the court cited Brown v. General Elec. Co., 733 F.2d 1085 (4th
Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 189 (1984), which rejected a due process challenge to § 1-50(6). Tet-
terton, 314 N.C. at 57, 332 S.E.2d at 75.
116. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
117. See Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982); Barnhouse v. City
of Pinole, 133 Cal. App. 3d 171, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1982); Gardner v. Johnson, 451 So. 2d 477 (Fla.
1984); Flippen v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980); Terry v. New Mexico State Hwy.
Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 645 P.2d 1375 (1982).
Some courts have held that a statute is reasonable so long as it is reasonable as applied to the
majority of a particular class. The fact the statute would deny some plaintiffs a reasonable time in
which to bring suit would not violate due process under this standard. See, eg., Hargraves v. Brack-
ett Stripping Mach. Co., 317 F. Supp. 676, 683 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (A "statute of limitation must be
judged [for due process purposes] in the light of the broad class of cases to which it applies and if it is
reasonable with respect to the class, it will not be judged unreasonable merely because it is deemed to
operate harshly in a particular or exceptional instance."). The North Carolina Supreme Court, how-
ever, has clearly rejected this due process standard. In Flippen v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 114-15, 270
S.E.2d 482, 487 (1980), for example, the court held that the issue for due process purposes is
"whether the statute as applied to plaintiff afforded her a reasonable time within which to bring her
action."
118. See McClosky & Co. v. Eckart, 164 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1947); Buckner v. GAF Corp., 495
F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Hargraves v. Brackett Stripping Mach. Co., 317 F. Supp. 676 (E.D.
Tenn. 1970); Plant v. R.L. Reid, Inc., 294 Ala. 155, 313 So. 2d 518 (1975); Owen v. Wilson, 260
Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976); Lott v. Haley, 370 So. 2d 521 (La. 1979); O'Brien v. Hazelet &
Erdal, 410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336 (1980); Oole v. Oosting, 82 Mich. App. 291, 266 N.W.2d 795
(1978); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983); Flippen v. Jarrell, 301
N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980); Blevins v. Northwest Carolina Util., Inc., 209 N.C. 683, 184 S.E.
517 (1936); Barnhardt v. Morrison, 178 N.C. 563, 101 S.E. 218 (1919); Hite v. Town of West Co-
lumbia, 220 S.C. 59, 66 S.E.2d 427 (1951).
119. Gardner v. Johnson, 451 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1984); Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 397 So.
2d 671 (Fla. 1981) (McDonald, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds, Pullum v. Cincinnati,
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the plaintiff's cause of action accrues so close to the end of the statute of repose
period that the "time afforded for bringing suit on existing causes of action is so
short that the right to sue is 'practically denied,'"120 courts have allowed the
plaintiff the full statute of limitations period in which to file suit.
Reasonableness is a standard that must be applied on a case by case basis.
A striking example of an unreasonable application of section 1-50(6) is the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision in Brown v.
General Electric Co. 121 In Brown a restaurant fryer, which was originally
purchased on December 13, 1974, caused a fire on December 12, 1980.122
Under section 1-50(6), plaintiff in Brown had less than twenty-four hours in
which to bring suit against the manufacturer of the fryer because the cause of
action accrued more than five years and 364 days from the date of original sale.
With little analysis the court rejected plaintiff's contention that section 1-50(6)
unconstitutionally destroyed a vested right.1 23
A majority of courts have been more sympathetic to due process challenges
when a statute of repose functions procedurally to bar claims. For example, in
Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co. 124 the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held a products liability statute of repose unconstitutional as applied to a plain-
tiff who had only one year in which to bring suit. The court concluded that the
statute was unreasonable because plaintiff did not know the product's initial date
of purchase and thus had assumed the entire statute of limitations period was
available to file suit. 125
Other courts, however, have been less receptive to a plaintiff's due process
attack. 126 Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has indicated it is not
sympathetic to a plaintiff's claim of an unreasonable time in which to bring
suit,127 the court has ruled that thirty-nine days does not satisfy due process
Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985); Purk v. Federal Press Co., 387 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1980); Bauld v. J.A.
Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1978); MacRae v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 457 So. 2d 1093 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
120. Flippen v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 115, 270 S.E.2d 482, 487 (1980) (quoting Barnhardt v.
Morrison, 178 N.C. 563, 568, 101 S.E. 218, 221 (1919)); see also Dunn v. St. Francis Hosp., 401
A.2d 77, 80 (Del. 1979) (The statute of limitations will be upheld unless it is "so short as to amount
to a denial of the right itself.").
121. 733 F.2d 1085 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 189 (1984).
122. Id. at 1086.
123. Id.
124. 471 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1984).
125. Id. at 199-201. The only safe route for plaintiffs under the state's ten-year products liability
statute of repose was to bring suit on the day of the injury, an alternative which the court rejected as
unreasonable. Id.
126. See, eg., Gardner v. Johnson, 451 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1984) (six months reasonable); Pullum v.
Cincinnati, Inc., 458 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (18 months reasonable), aff'd, 476 So.
2d 657 (Fla. 1984); MacRae v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 457 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (22
months reasonable). But see Terry v. New Mexico State Highway Comm'n, 98 N.M. 119, 645 P.2d
1375 (1982) (three months unreasonable).
127. See, eg., Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 370-71, 98 S.E.2d 508, 514 (1957), in which the
court held:
Statutes of limitation are inflexible and unyielding. They operate inexorably without refer-
ence to the merits of plaintiff's cause of action. They are statutes of repose, intended to




Based on the state supreme court's unequivocal refusal to find section 1-
50(6) unconstitutional in Tetterton and the statute's potential for unfairness in
many cases, the North Carolina General Assembly should amend section 1-
50(6).129 A much fairer approach, which legislatures have enacted in two
states, 130 focuses on the useful life of the product in determining the time period
in which a plaintiff must bring suit. If an injury occurs after the product's useful
life, the statute denies recovery. 13 1 Further, the statute establishes a presump-
tion that the useful life of a product has expired a certain number of years after
sale.132 This presumption serves the same purpose as a statute of repose, but is
less arbitrary because it can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 133
The proposed approach deals directly with a main problem associated with
products liability statutes of repose-distinguishing between manufacturers of
durable goods and manufacturers of nondurable goods.134 Plaintiffs are not
The purpose of a statute of limitations is to afford security against stale demands, not
to deprive anyone of his just rights by lapse of time. In some instances, it may operate to
bar the maintenance of meritorious causes of action. When confronted with such a cause,
the urge is strong to write into the statute exceptions that do not appear therein. In such
case, we must bear in mind Lord Campbell's caution: "Hard cases must not make bad
law."
Id. (citations omitted).
128. Flippen v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980). The court strongly implied that it
would consider an eight month period to be sufficient. In dicta the court also indicated that it would
consider a period of five or six months to be unreasonable. Id. at 114, 270 S.E.2d at 486; see also
Martin v. Smith, 534 F. Supp. 804 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (six months unreasonable under § 1-50(6)).
129. Even without any legislative reform, however, plaintiffs' attorneys may still exercise several
options for limiting the statute's severity. Plaintiffs with delayed manifestation diseases caused by a
defective product may still successfully challenge the constitutionality of § 1-50(6) as applied to
them. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs who are given an unreasonable
amount of time in which to bring suit may also successfully challenge the constitutionality of § 1-
50(6). See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text. In addition, a court could read a wide variety
of exceptions and limitations into § 1-50(6). For a discussion of several possibilities, see Blanchard
& Abrams, supra note 3, at 201-02; Phillips, supra note 2, at 666-72.
130. IDAHO CODE § 6-1303 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060(2) (Supp. 1986).
131. There is one exception, however. The manufacturers will be liable beyond the useful life of
the product only if they have given an express warranty for a longer period. IDAHO CODE § 6-
1303(l)(b) (Supp. 1985).
132. In Idaho the presumption begins ten years after delivery of the product. IDAHO CODE § 6-
1303(2)(a) (Supp. 1985). In Washington the presumption begins twelve years after delivery. WAsH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060(2) (Supp. 1986).
133. IDAHO CODE § 6-1303(2)(b) (Supp. 1985). In Washington the presumption may be over-
come by a preponderance of the evidence. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060(2) (Supp. 1986).
134. See supra note 46. TIe limitation of § 1-50(6) is harsh in that it arbitrarily abolishes the
claims of certain plaintiffs without regard to the facts of the particular case. Thus, manufacturers of
airplanes, who can expect their products to continue in use for a long period, will be immune from a
products liability suit in North Carolina after only six years. Manufacturers of hairdryers, on the
other hand, who do not share the same expectation of long-term use of their products, get little or no
protection from the statute during the product's useful life. A plaintiff in all likelihood still has a
strong claim against the airplane manufacturer after six years but not the hairdryer manufacturer;
yet the plaintiff's claim against both is barred. The problem was clearly set forth by the Utah
Supreme Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 681 (Utah 1985), when it observed:
The six-year and ten-year periods in the [Utah Products Liability] Act are arbitrary be-
cause they apply to all kinds of products, irrespective of their useful life. The statute does
not even purport to approximate an average expected life of the products covered, nor is it
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barred from pursuing meritorious claims, while manufacturers are guaranteed
that they will not be liable for use of their products indefinitely.
Tetterton represents a strong rejection of most constitutional attacks on
North Carolina's six-year products liability statute of repose. After Tetterton
constitutional challenges to section 1-50(6) have a reasonable likelihood of suc-
cess in only two instances. First, plaintiffs whose injuries manifest themselves
long after they are actually inflicted may have a constitutional right to a legal
remedy notwithstanding the provisions of section 1-50(6). Second, plaintiffs
who are given an unreasonably short time in which to bring suit for vested
causes of action can probably successfully attack section 1-50(6) as applied to
them. In light of the Tetterton decision and the unfairness of the statute in prac-
tice, however, the general assembly should amend section 1-50(6) to strike a
more just balance between the rights of manufacturers and the rights of those
injured by their products.
CHARLES A. BURKE
based on products that have presented particular safety difficulties. It applies alike to
toasters, automobiles, road graders, and prescription drugs.
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State v. Cofield: Petit Deliberation
of Grand Jury Discrimination
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "no per-
son shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury."1 Since 1880, in an unbroken line
of cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that discrimination in the
selection of grand jury members constitutes a violation of the equal protection
clause.2 When a particular race or class has been arbitrarily excluded from a
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment does not apply in certain military cases. Id.
"Grand jury" is defined as:
Body of citizens, the number of whom varies from state to state, whose duties consist in
determining whether probable cause exists that a crime has been committed and whether
an indictment (true bill) should be returned against one for such a crime. If the grand jury
determines that probable cause does not exist, it returns a "no bill." It is an accusatory
body and its function does not involve a determination of guilt.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 768 (5th ed. 1979).
The origin of the grand jury can be traced to the early history of England. Initially, it was
instituted to assist the Crown in investigating crimes, but later came to be valued as an institution
that protected the King's subjects against the oppression of unfounded prosecutions by the Crown.
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.2, at 347-49 (1985). The American colonies
adopted the grand jury as a part of the common law. They held its protection against unfounded
accusations in high esteem, in part because grand juries had refused to indict various persons op-
posed to Royalist power. Id.
When the Bill of Rights was added to the federal constitution, a grand jury screening provision
was placed in the fifth amendment without opposition. At that time almost all of the state constitu-
tions also required that felony prosecutions be brought by indictment. In 1859 Michigan became the
first state to authorize prosecutors to bring felony prosecutions by information as well as by indict-
ment. Id. The difference was that a competent public officer, rather than a grand jury, could present
a sworn, written accusation to a magistrate to bring a person to trial. In 1884 the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of this alternative method of initiating prosecutions in Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). The Court held that the due process clause, as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, does not require a state to adopt the institution and procedure of
a grand jury. Id. at 538. As a result, the number of states allowing felony prosecutions to be
brought by information as well as by indictment has grown steadily over the years. Today only
nineteen states still require prosecution by indictment for all felonies. England has since abolished
the grand jury altogether. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra, § 8.2, at 347-49.
The North Carolina Constitution provides that:
Except in misdemeanor cases initiated in the District Court Division, no person shall be
put to answer any criminal charge but by indictment, presentment, or impeachment. But
any person, when represented by counsel, may, under such regulations as the General As-
sembly shall prescribe, waive indictment in noncapital cases.
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 22.
2. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 545 (1979); Alex-
ander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v.
Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354 (1939); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900);
Bush v. Kennedy, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313 (1880).
Although the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution requires that members of a particu-
lar race or class who are qualified for jury service shall not be arbitrarily excluded therefrom, it has
also emphasized that a particular defendant is not constitutionally entitled to have a jury composed
of some members, or even a single member, of his or her race or class. See infra notes 29, 101. The
Supreme Court, however, has extended the constitutional right to challenge systematic exclusion of
any racial group from grand or petit juries to all criminal defendants regardless of their membership
in the excluded race. See infra note 47.
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grand jury in a criminal prosecution, neither the resulting indictment nor the
conviction can stand, irrespective of the accused's guilt or evidence of actual
prejudice. 3 In recent years criminal defendants have sought reversal of their
convictions and dismissal of indictments against them on the ground that dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jury foremen violated their fundamental
rights of due process under the fifth amendment and equal protection under the
fourteenth amendment.4 In State v. Cofield5 the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals refused to extend constitutional protection to this area. In a case of first
impression, the court held that because there was no binding precedent on this
issue, an otherwise valid conviction would not be reversed due to evidence of
discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman.6
This Note examines the development of constitutional protections against
race and class discrimination in the selection of jurors and the policy considera-
tions associated with extending these principles to foreman selection procedures.
In addition, this Note analyzes the court of appeals' holding in Cofield and con-
cludes that the decision will have a detrimental impact on individual rights as
well as on the fundamental values of our judicial and political systems.
A Northampton County Grand Jury indicted Ernest Richard Cofield on
charges of first degree rape and felonious breaking and entering.7 At trial the
State introduced testimony of the victim that on the morning of June 25, 1984,
she heard a knock at her front door. When she answered, a man wearing a blue
work uniform asked for water for his logging truck parked in front of her
house.8 The victim closed the door, retrieved jugs from her kitchen and took
them to an enclosed back porch to fill them. After she filled the jugs, the man
entered the porch and asked for a cigarette. The victim returned to the kitchen
to find one and handed the man an open pack as he walked up to the kitchen
door.9 When she turned to close the door, the man grabbed her, dragged her
into a bedroom, and raped her. The victim identified her assailant as the defend-
ant, Ernest Cofield, a truck driver for a local logging company. 10
The trial jury found defendant guilty of second degree rape and felonious
breaking and entering. The superior court judge imposed consecutive sentences
of thirty years for the rape conviction and three years for the breaking and enter-
ing conviction. I Cofield appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to quash the indictment because discrimination against blacks in se-
3. See cases cited supra note 2.
4. See Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984); Rose v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 545 (1979);
United States v. Cross, 708 F.2d 631 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated, 468 U.S. 1212 (1984); United States
v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, Dentico v. United States, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984);
United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d 1380 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Coletta, 682
F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1982), cer. denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983); Guice v. Fortenberry, 642 F.2d 98 (5th
Cir. 1981).
5. 77 N.C. App. 699, 336 S.E.2d 439 (1985).
6. Id. at 702, 336 S.E.2d at 441.
7. Id. at 700, 336 S.E.2d at 440.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 700-01, 336 S.E.2d at 440.
11. Id. at 701, 336 S.E.2d at 440.
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lection of grand jury foremen in Northampton County denied him his due pro-
cess and equal protection rights under the North Carolina and United States
Constitutions.1 2
The North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to reverse the conviction. The court noted that there is a pre-
sumption under state law that public officials have carried out their
responsibilities in an impartial and equitable manner.' 3 To rebut this presump-
tion in the context of grand jury foreman selection, a defendant must introduce
evidence covering a significant period of time on the total number of individuals
serving as foremen and the number of members of the allegedly excluded class
chosen as foremen. In addition, a defendant must establish the relative size of
that class compared with the total population in the district and demonstrate a
"6sufficiently large disparity" between the two.14
In Cofield there was unrebutted testimony that sixty-one percent of North-
ampton County's population was black. The Northampton Superior Court
Clerk testified that in the past eighteen years only one black person had served
as grand jury foreman and that was for a one year period in 1979.15 Neverthe-
less, the court determined that because there was no evidence on the total
number of individuals selected as foremen over the relevant time period, it was
impossible to perform the statistical calculations necessary to make out a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. 16 The court concluded by saying, "Even if a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment could be found in the selection of grand
jury foremen, reversal of an otherwise valid conviction is not mandated by any
precedent binding on this Court."'17
Judge Becton strongly dissented from the majority's resolution of the issue
because he felt Cofield had presented a prima facie case of discrimination in the
context of grand jury foreman selection.' 8 To establish a prima facie case, Bec-
ton observed, the defendant must show that "the procedure employed in the
selection of grand jury foremen is susceptible to abuse or is not racially neutral
and results in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable
group to which he belongs.... The burden then shifts to the State to rebut the
prima facie case."' 19 Based on uncontradicted evidence that during the past
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing State v. Wilson, 262 N.C. 419, 423, 137 S.E.2d 109, 113 (1964)). The court
conceded that the fourteenth amendment prohibits purposeful racial discrimination in the selection
of grand jury foremen. The court held, however, that defendant had failed to present sufficient
evidence to make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination so as to require a reversal of his
conviction. Id. at 701, 336 S.E.2d at 440.
14. Id. at 701-02, 336 S.E.2d at 440 (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 571 (1979)).
15. Id. at 702, 336 S.E.2d at 440.
16. Id. at 702, 336 S.E.2d at 441.
17. Id. The court relied on a statement by the United States Supreme Court that " '[s]o long as
the grand jury itself is properly constituted, there is no risk that the appointment of any one of its
members as foremen will distort the overall composition of the array or otherwise taint the operation
of the judicial process.' " Id. (quoting Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 348 (1984)).
18. Id. at 705, 336 S.E.2d at 442 (Becton, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 706, 336 S.E.2d at 443 (Becton, J., dissenting) (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,
565 (1979) and Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)).
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eighteen years only one black had served as grand jury foreman in Northampton
County, where sixty-one percent of the population was black, the dissent rea-
soned that the disparity in representation was sufficiently large to raise a pre-
sumption of discrimination in foreman selection procedures. Finding that the
State had failed to rebut this presumption, the dissent would have quashed the
indictment. 20
The United States Supreme Court first addressed discrimination in the se-
lection of jury members in a series of four cases in the early 1880s. In Strauder
v. West Virginia2 1 a black defendant convicted of murder challenged a state stat-
ute expressly excluding blacks from jury service. The Court held that the statute
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 2 The Court
noted, "The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers and
equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that
is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, [and] persons having the same legal sta-
tus in society as that which he holds."123 By denying blacks the right to partici-
pate in the administration of law, the statute branded them as inferior and
stimulated racial prejudice.24 Therefore, the conviction was reversed and the
case remanded to the federal courts for a new trial free from racial taint.25
Virginia v. Rives2 6 also involved a black defendant indicted for murder by a
grand jury selected from a venire composed "entirely of the white race."127 Un-
like the situation in Strauder, the exclusion of blacks in Rives was not pursuant
to state statute. Therefore, removal to the federal court system was not
proper.28 The Court held that "a right to which every colored man is entitled,
20. Cofield, 77 N.C. App. at 706-07, 336 S.E.2d at 443 (Becton, J., dissenting). Judge Becton
rejected the notion that the appointment of a black foreman in 1979 for a one year period "'totally
obliterated any vestage of racial stigma which could conceivably be said to have existed prior to 1979
with respect to the selection of grand jury foremen.'" Id. at 707, 336 S.E.2d at 443 (quoting Brief
for the State at 3, Cofield).
21. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
22. Id. at 310. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
Discrimination on the basis of race was the primary evil at which the amendments adopted after
the Civil War, including the fourteenth amendment, were aimed. The equal protection clause was
central to the fourteenth amendment's prohibition of discriminatory action by a state. The clause
banned most types of purposeful discrimination by a state on the basis of race in an attempt to lift
the burdens placed on blacks by society. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-08.
23. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 312.
26. 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
27. Id. at 314.
28. Id. at 320-21. At the time, removal from state to federal court was proper when a "civil
suit or prosecution [was] commenced in any State court, for any cause whatsoever, against any
person who [was] denied or [could not] enforce in the judicial tribunals of the state,... any right
secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States." Id. at
317. The Court commented that when a state statute denied one's civil rights, such a case was
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[is] that, in the selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty, or property, there
shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against them because of
their color."'29 The appropriate remedy, according to the Court, would be for
the Virginia courts to "correct the wrong" and "quash the indictment." 3
0
In Ex parte Virginia31 a state judge refused to select blacks to serve as
grand and petit jurors. He was indicted under the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and
filed suit for habeas corpus.32 In denying the writ, the United States Supreme
Court emphasized that one of the purposes of the fourteenth amendment was to
elevate blacks "from that condition of inferiority and servitude in which most of
them had previously stood, into perfect equality of civil rights with all persons
within the jurisdiction of the States. [It] was intended to take away all possibil-
ity of oppression by law because of race or color." 33 The Court noted that one
of these civil rights was the right of criminal defendants to an impartial jury
selected in a racially nondiscriminatory fashion and that section five of the four-
teenth amendment empowers Congress to enforce this right by means of crimi-
nal sanctions.34
Finally, in Neal v. Delaware 35 a black defendant indicted for rape moved to
quash his indictment on the ground that blacks had been excluded from the pool
of potential grand jurors because of race. The evidence indicated that no black
citizens had ever been chosen to serve as jurors in Delaware, even though the
black population was over 26,000 in 1880, out of a total population of less than
150,000.36 Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, observed that this was a
prima facie denial "of that equality of protection which has been secured by the
Constitution."' 37 In addition, Harlan criticized the judgment of state officials
clearly removable. Yet when an officer of the state, in violation of local law, denied a defendant a
right afforded by statute, then the state courts were the appropriate forums to address the wrong. Id.
at 321-22.
29. Id. at 322-23. The Court, however, qualified this right: "A mixed jury in a particular case
is not essential to the equal protection of the laws, and the right to it is not given by any law of
Virginia, or by any Federal statute. It is not, therefore, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id.
30. Id. at 322.
31. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
32. Id. at 342. Section 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 provided:
[No citizen, possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law
should be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any Court of the United States,
or of any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and any
officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors who
shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the case aforesaid shall, on conviction
thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be fined not more than $5,000.
Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62
Stat. 862.
33. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 344-45.
34. Id. at 345. Exparte Virginia is a rare example of an attempt to remedy discriminatory jury
selection procedures through criminal sanctions. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1875 authorizes
the federal government to bring criminal actions against state officials responsible for discrimination,
the almost universal remedy is that set forth in Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880)-to quash the
indictment and begin anew. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
35. 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
36. Id. at 397.
37. Id.
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that blacks were "utterly disqualified, by want of intelligence, experience, or
moral integrity, to sit on juries" as a "violent presumption" which could not
stand. 38 Thus, the Court granted the motion to quash the indictment, conclud-
ing that otherwise "the constitutional prohibition has no meaning."'39
These early cases set the precedent for a century of subsequent litigation.
In an unbroken line of cases since 1880, the Supreme Court has held that under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, criminal defendants
are entitled to grand and petit juries selected in a racially nondiscriminatory
manner.4° When discrimination is sufficiently proven, the Court has consist-
ently required that the indictment be quashed and the conviction be set aside.4 1
The North Carolina Supreme Court has affirmed these same core equal pro-
tection principles as a matter of state constitutional law on several occasions. In
State v. Wilson 42 the court quashed the indictment of a black defendant con-
victed of rape based on evidence that one-fourth of the population of Cleveland
County was black and that only two or three blacks had served on the county's
grand juries within the last seven years.4 3 The court noted, "A valid indictment
returned by a legally constituted grand jury is an essential of jurisdiction." 44
Evidence of substantial underrepresentation of blacks on county grand juries
over a significant period of time constitutes a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination on the basis of race. The burden then shifts to the state to rebut
that case by "competent evidence" other than mere denials of intentional dis-
crimination.45 If the state fails to overcome defendant's prima facie showing,
"the bill of indictment must be quashed."'46
38. Id.
39. Id. at 397 (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880)).
40. See cases cited supra note 2. For additional information on constitutional challenges to
discrimination in the selection of jurors, see W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 15.3, at 623-
30; Diamond, Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Grand Juror Selection, 16 COLUM. J.L.
& SoC. PRoBS. 85 (1980); Note, The Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury Selection: A
Study in Standing, Due Process, and Equal Protection, 74 YALE L.J. 919 (1965); Annot., 33 L.E.2d
783 (1972). For a discussion of racial prejudice's influence on the determination of guilt and a
proposal that social science data serve as proof of purposeful discrimination under equal protection
principles, see Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985).
41. See cases cited supra note 2.
42. 262 N.C. 419, 137 S.E.2d 109 (1964); see also State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E.2d 870
(1965) (prima facie case of systematic exclusion established by showing the population ratio and that
only a token number of blacks had served on the grand jury; if unrebutted, indictment quashed and
judgment vacated); State v. Perry, 250 N.C. 119, 108 S.E.2d 447 (1959) (indictment returned by
grand jury from which members of an identifiable group have been purposefully rejected violates
equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment); Miller v. State, 237 N.C. 29, 74 S.E.2d 513 (1953)
(arbitrary exclusion of citizens from service on grand juries on the basis of race constitutionally
forbidden).
The North Carolina Supreme Court actually invalidated intentional racial discrimination in the
selection of grand jury members prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Strauder. In Capehart v.
Stewart, 80 N.C. 90 (1879), the court held that a judge could not direct the sheriff to summon
members of a specified race for jury service. The court stated, "The law knows no distinction among
the people of the state in their civil and political rights and corresponding obligations and none such
should be recognized by those who are charged with its administration." Id. at 102.
43. Wilson, 262 N.C. at 422, 137 S.E.2d at 113.
44. Id. at 421, 137 S.E.2d at 112.
45. Id. at 421-22, 137 S.E.2d at 112.
46. Id. at 425, 137 S.E.2d at 114.
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In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has expanded both the
classes of individuals47 that can challenge systematic discrimination in the selec-
tion of juries, and the procedures48 and constitutional doctrines4 9 for doing so.
47. In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), the Court extended the constitutional right to chal-
lenge discriminatory jury selection procedures to all criminal defendants regardless of their member-
ship in the excluded class or any evidence of actual prejudice. Peters, convicted of burglary in the
state courts of Georgia, filed a habeas corpus petition in the federal courts alleging that blacks had
been systematically excluded from the grand jury that had indicted him. The court of appeals af-
firmed the denial of the petition because Peters was not black. Id. at 494. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "whatever his race, a criminal defendant has standing to challenge the system
used to select his grand or petit jury, on the ground that it arbitrarily excludes from service the
members of any race, and thereby denies due process of law." Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
Although the plurality opinion rested its decision on the fifth amendment right to due process,
it also implicated the sixth amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury:
[Wihen any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service,
the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of
human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not
necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to
conclude, as we do, that their exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events
that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.
Id. at 503-04. Later cases explored the sixth amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury. See infra
note 49.
48. Strauder and the other early cases of discriminatory jury selection procedures involved ab-
solute exclusion of an identifiable group. Later Supreme Court cases established the principle that
substantial underrepresentation of such a group constitutes a constitutional violation as well, if it
results from purposeful discrimination. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Whitus v. Geor-
gia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Johnson, supra note 40, at 1652-
53.
In 1977 the Court articulated the appropriate criteria for establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination:
[In order to show that an equal protection violation has occurred in the context of grand
jury selection, the defendant must show that the procedure employed resulted in a substan-
tial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs. The
first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled
out for different treatment under the laws as written or applied.... Next, the degree of
underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total
population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of
time.... Finally,... a selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially
neutral supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing....
Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group, he has made
out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the burden then shifts to the state to
rebut that case.
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977).
In Castaneda a Texas prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition alleging a denial of due process and
equal protection because of gross underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on past grand juries.
Id. at 490. The evidence indicated that the population of the county was 79.1% Mexican-American,
but that only 39% of the persons summoned for grand jury service over an eleven-year period were
Mexican-Americans. Id. at 495-96. When the state failed to rebut the presumption of purposeful
discrimination with competent evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding
that such a disparity constituted a denial of equal protection in the grand jury selection process. Id.
at 501.
49. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1974), the Supreme Court examined the sixth amend-
ment right to an impartial jury as a means of challenging the process used to impanel grand and petitjuries. Taylor, a male defendant indicted for kidnapping, moved to quash the venire because of the
systematic exclusion of women. His motion was denied, and he appealed, challenging a state law
that excluded women from jury service unless they filed a written declaration of a desire to be called.
Id. at 523-25. The Court held that the sixth amendment requires that a jury be selected from a
"cross-section of the community," id. at 529-30, and that the systematic exclusion of women violated
this requirement, id. at 530-31. The Court declared that excluding large distinctive groups from the
jury pool frustrates the purpose of the jury as a check against the exercise of arbitrary state and
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Recently, criminal defendants, instead of challenging the entire composition of
the grand jury, have sought to quash their indictments on the ground that racial
discrimination in the selection of grand jury foremen violated their equal protec-
tion and due process rights.50 The Supreme Court has addressed this issue on
two occasions.
In Rose v. Mitchell 51 two black defendants convicted of murder alleged that
the foreman of the grand jury that had indicted them had been chosen in a
racially discriminatory fashion. Reviewing the case in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing, the Supreme Court "[assumed] without deciding that discrimination with
regard to the selection of only the foreman requires that a subsequent conviction
be set aside, just as if the discrimination proved had tainted the selection of the
entire grand jury venire. ' '52
The Court explicitly addressed the question whether its unbroken line of
case law reversing convictions for discrimination in the selection of grand jury
members should be reconsidered in favor of a harmless error standard. 53 Jus-
tices Stewart and Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion, argued that discrimination
in the selection of the grand jury had no effect on the fairness of a later trial or
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 54 They maintained that any harm to the
defendant could be adequately remedied by civil actions, pretrial remedies, or
prosecutions against the discriminating government officials.55 The majority,
however, rejected this approach, emphasizing that the injury caused by the dis-
crimination is not only to the defendant but also to the courts, the jury system,
judicial power, and erodes "public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system." Id. at
530.
In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), the Court again upheld a male defendant's right to
contest a state law excluding a disproportionate number of women from jury duty. The Court out-
lined the elements necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement
of the sixth amendment. A defendant must show:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that
the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection
process.
Id. at 364. The burden then shifts to the state to demonstrate "a significant state interest." Id. at
367. Thus, "'the right to a proper jury cannot be overcome on purely rational grounds.' " Id. at
367 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)).
Cofield, however, did not raise a sixth amendment challenge to the selection of his grand jury
foreman. He relied solely on the fifth amendment's guarantee of due process and the fourteenth
amendment's right to equal protection. See supra text accompanying note 12.
50. See cases cited supra note 4.
51. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
52. Id. at 551 n.4. The Court did not have to decide the issue because it held that defendants
had failed to make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the fore-
man. Id. at 574.
53. Id. at 550-51.
54. Id. at 575-76 (Stewart and Rehnquist, J.J., concurring). This concurrence stated that
"'deprivations of constitutional rights that occur before trial are no bar to conviction unless there
has been an impact upon the trial itself. A conviction after trial, like a guilty plea, represents a break
in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.'" Id. at 576 (Stewart and
Rehnquist, J.J., concurring) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)).
55. Id. at 578 (Stewart and Rehnquist, J.J., concurring).
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and society as a whole.5 6 "[Although] alternative remedies remain to vindicate
the fights of those members of the class denied the chance to serve on grand
juries, the fact is that permitting challenges to unconstitutional state action by
defendants has been, and is, the main avenue by which Fourteenth Amendment
rights are vindicated in this context."'5 7 The Court reaffirmed its position that
discrimination in choosing grand jury members requires reversal of an otherwise
valid conviction.5 8 Nevertheless, the Court refused to reverse defendants' con-
victions in this case because they had failed to prove underrepresentation suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case.59
More recently, in Hobby v. United States ,60 the Supreme Court again con-
sidered discriminatory foreman selection procedures, but on a different constitu-
tional theory. Hobby, a white male indicted and convicted on federal fraud
charges, argued that discrimination in the selection of the federal grand jury
foreman, resulting in an underrepresentation of blacks and women in that posi-
tion, violated the due process clause and required both dismissal of the indict-
ment against him and reversal of his conviction.6 1 The Court agreed that the
fifth amendment prohibits purposeful discrimination against blacks or women in
designating a federal grand jury foreman, assumed that discrimination occurred
in this particular selection process, and proceeded to consider the appropriate
remedy. 62 The Court reasoned that, federal grand jury foremen perform essen-
tially clerical functions and that therefore, the role of the foreman is not consti-
tutionally significant. 63 "Given the ministerial nature of the position,
discrimination in the selection of one person from among the members of a
properly constituted grand jury can have little, if indeed any, appreciable effect
56. Id. at 554-56. The Court noted,
Because discrimination on the basis of race in the selection of members of a grand jury thus
strikes at the fundamental values of our judicial system and our society as a whole, the
Court has recognized that a criminal defendant's right to equal protection of the laws has
been denied when he is indicted by a grand jury from which members of a racial group
purposefully have been excluded.... For this same reason, the Court also has reversed the
conviction and ordered the indictment quashed in such cases without inquiry into whether
the defendant was prejudiced in fact by the discrimination at the grand jury stage.
Id. at 556.
57. Id. at 558.
58. Id. at 559.
59. Id. at 574. The evidence of discriminatory foreman selection procedures consisted of the
testimony of three former foremen. The Court found that the evidence did not cover a significant
time period. Id. at 570. Furthermore, there was no affirmative testimony of a total exclusion of
blacks from the position during that time. Id. at 570-71. Finally, according to the Court, there was
no evidence on the total number of foremen appointed in the county during the relevant time period.
Without such evidence, the Court concluded, it was "difficult to say that the number of Negroes
appointed foreman, even if zero, is statistically so significant-as to make out a case of discrimination
under the rule of 'exclusion.'" Id. at 571.
60. 468 U.S. 339 (1984).
61. Id. at 340-41. For additional sources evaluating Rose, see Note, Constitutional Challenges
to Grand Jury Foreperson-Selection Procedures, 17 GA. L. REv. 153 (1982); Note, Rose v. Mitchell:
Grand Jury Discrimination-Rebalancing the Scales of Justice, 7 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 304 (1980).
62. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 342-43.
63. Id. at 344-45. In the federal system the court selects a foreman from among the members of
the grand jury after they have been impaneled. The foreman is responsible for administering oaths,
keeping a record of the jurors' votes, and reporting indictments to the Court. Id. at 344 (citing FED.
R. CRIM. P. 6(c)).
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upon the defendant's due process right to fundamental fairness."'64
In addition, the Court rejected Hobby's argument that Rose supported re-
versal of his conviction on equal protection grounds. The Court focused solely
on the due process question presented and carefully distinguished the different
concerns raised under the equal protection clause and its decision in Rose.65
Acknowledging that the equal protection clause offers relief for discrimination in
the context of grand and petit juries, the Court emphasized that defendant had
challenged the underrepresentation of blacks and women in the foreman posi-
tion only under principles of due process. "[D]iscrimination in the selection of
federal grand jury foremen cannot be said to have a significant impact upon the
due process interests of criminal defendants." 66 Therefore, the Court refused to
reverse Hobby's conviction or dismiss his indictment. 67
State v. Cofield 68 presented the first opportunity for a North Carolina court
64. Id. at 345.
65. Id. at 347. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
66. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 347. The Court also distinguished Rose on its facts. In Tennessee the
judge appointed the foreman from the general population as the thirteenth member of the jury, with
the same powers as the twelve properly selected jurors. By contrast, the foreman in Hobby was
selected under the federal system from within the properly constituted grand jury. Id. In addition,
the grand jury foreman in Tennessee had "virtual veto power over the indictment process" and
thereby played a substantially greater role than the clerical and ministerial functions of a federal
grand jury foreman. Id. at 348.
Although the Hobby decision might appear to limit Rose to its particular facts, the Supreme
Court did not repudiate any of the subsequent courts of appeals' cases holding that discrimination in
the selection of grand jury foremen does violate the equal protection clause. See United States v.
Sneed, 729 F.2d 1333, 1335 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (selection of grand jury foreman protected under equal
protection clause); Guice v. Fortenberry, 722 F.2d 276, 281 (5th Cir. 1984) (systematic exclusion of
blacks as grand jury foremen found when judge failed to appoint blacks as grand jury foremen in 31
grand juries over 15 years and when he used no objective criteria to select foremen), reh'g denied,
726 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d 1380, 1385-86 (1 1th Cir.
1982) (per curiam) ("fair cross-section" protection of sixth amendment not basis for challenging
selection of grand jury foreman, but equal protection clause does provide such a basis).
67. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 350. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, vigor-
ously dissented from the majority opinion. First, Marshall noted that deliberate exclusion of blacks
in the selection of a grand jury foreman perpetuates racial prejudices and "vicious stereotypes that
our society has been struggling to erase" and also diminishes public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial process. Id. at 352-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Second, Marshall maintained that the ma-
jority underestimated the significance of the foreman. The foreman takes the votes, signs the official
documents, administers the oaths, excuses members in emergency situations, and responds for the
others in open court. Further, trial judges usually devote considerable time to the selection process
in an effort to appoint capable persons. Id. at 356-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Last, Marshall
emphasized that the majority offered no viable alternative to the traditional remedy of dismissing the
indictment and reversing the conviction for judicial discrimination in the grand jury selection pro-
cess. Id. at 359-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. 77 N.C. App. 699, 336 S.E.2d 439 (1985). The court of appeals considered this issue again
in State v. Gary, 78 N.C. App. 29, 337 SE.2d 70 (1985). In Gary defendant was indicted for and
convicted of conspiracy to sell and deliver cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to sell and
deliver, and maintaining a business for the use and sale of controlled substances. On appeal he
argued that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss his indictment, because discrimination against
blacks in the selection of a grand jury foreman abridged his equal protection rights. Id. at 30-31, 337
S.E.2d at 72.
The court of appeals reviewed the applicable case law from Rose and Hobby, and suggested that
Rose was limited to its facts, Id. at 31-32, 337 S.E.2d at 72-73. Moreover, the court analogized to
Hobby and reasoned that in North Carolina the foreman performs essentially inconsequential, minis-
terial functions such as presiding over hearings and administering oaths, releasing jurors, requesting
that the grand jury be allowed to interview further witnesses, and returning the bill of indictment.
"[A]Ithough the foreman by statute must indicate which witness(es) were sworn and examined, G.S.
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to evaluate a challenge of racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury
foreman. Relying on Rose, the court of appeals acknowledged that purposeful
discrimination against blacks in choosing a grand jury foreman is prohibited by
the fourteenth amendment.69 In considering whether sufficient evidence of dis-
crimination existed to merit a reversal of the conviction, the court noted that
there is a presumption that public officials have carried out their duties in an
impartial and nondiscriminatory fashion.70 To rebut this presumption in the
context of grand jury foreman selection, the defendant bears the burden of proof
to introduce evidence of the number of individuals who have served as foremen
over a significant time period, the number of foremen chosen from a distinct
class, the relative size of that class in terms of the total population of the district,
and a "sufficiently large disparity" between the two.7 1
Although uncontradicted testimonial evidence established that sixty-one
percent of the county's population was black and that only one black person had
served as grand jury foreman in the eighteen years prior to defendant's indict-
ment, the majority denied that Cofield had established a sufficient presumption
of underrepresentation. 72 The court reasoned, "'Inasmuch as there is no evi-
dence in the record of the number of foremen appointed, it is not possible to
perform the calculations and comparisons needed to permit a court to conclude
that a statistical case of discrimination has been made out and proof under the
'rule of exclusion' fails.' ",73 In addition, the court stated that even if there were
sufficient proof of discrimination in the selection of grand jury foremen so as to
abridge a defendant's fourteenth amendment rights, there was no binding prece-
dent for reversing an otherwise valid conviction.74
The Cofield case requires analysis on two levels. First, it demands a delib-
eration on the facts to determine if the defendant established a prima facie case
of racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman. Second, it ne-
cessitates a resolution of the question whether such conduct violates a constitu-
tional right, and if so, a determination of the appropriate remedy. The court of
appeals' opinion is misguided and mysterious on both accounts.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of grand
jury foremen, a defendant must show that "the procedure employed resulted in a
substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which
15-623(c), and must sign the indictment, G.S. 15-644(a)(5), the absence of these endorsements will
not render an otherwise valid indictment fatally defective." Id. at 33, 337 S.E.2d at 73. Thus, the
court concluded that there was no prejudice to defendant's equal protection rights: "The role of the
foreman of a North Carolina grand jury is not 'so significant to the administration of justice that
discrimination in the appointment of that office impugns the fundamental fairness of the process
itself so as to undermine the integrity of the indictment.' " Id. at 34, 337 S.E.2d at 74 (quoting
Hobby, 468 U.S. at 345). Defendant's motion was dismissed. Gary, 78 N.C. App. at 34, 337 S.E.2d
at 74.
69. Cofield, 77 N.C. App. at 701, 336 S.E.2d at 440.
70. Id. (citing State v. Wilson, 262 N.C. 419, 423, 137 S.E.2d 109, 113 (1964)).
71. Id. at 701-02, 336 S.E.2d at 440 (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 571 (1979)).
72. Id. at 702, 336 S.E.2d at 440-41.
73. Id. at 702, 336 S.E.2d at 441 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 571-72 (1979)).
74. Cofield, 77 N.C. App. at 702, 336 S.E.2d at 441.
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he belongs." s75 To do this, a defendant must introduce evidence to demonstrate
(1) that a recognizable, distinct group was targeted for unequal treatment under
the laws, (2) that a significant disparity exists between the proportion of the
group serving as foremen and the proportion of that group in the general popu-
lation over an extended period of time, and (3) that the selection procedure is
"susceptible of abuse" or otherwise "not racially neutral."'76
The court conceded that the first and third of these elements were estab-
lished. Cofield, as a black American, was clearly a member of an identifiable
class susceptible of being singled out for unequal treatment under the law. 77 In
addition, the selection procedure for foremen in Northampton County was sub-
ject to misuse. The evidence indicated that the superior court judge appointed
one of the grand jurors as foreman without any statutory or judicial guidelines.
"'The Judge usually confers with whoever he wants to' when making his selec-
tion .... , and apparently does so in a casual and off-the-record fashion.... It is
a system devoid of checks, balances or requirements of any kind. Such a system
is susceptible of abuse."7 8
The court's failure to recognize discrimination in Cofield was based on its
interpretation of the second element of the prima facie case-underrepresenta-
tion of the class discriminated against as compared with the proportion of the
total population. The court analogized to Rose and suggested that there was no
evidence on the number of persons who had served as grand jury foremen in the
county during the prior eighteen years.79 The defendant's brief, however,
clearly stated, "During that same period, the [trial] court was presented with the
opportunity to appoint some 36foreman [sic]. While 61% of the county's popu-
lation was black, a black member of the community held the position of foreman
for only 5.6% of the time."80 By contrast, in Rose there was no indication of
the total number of foremen appointed by a county judge during the relevant
time period.81 It is difficult to believe that, absent racially discriminatory moti-
vation, only one black person was qualified to serve as grand jury foreman in
thirty-six selections, from 324 grand jurors chosen over an eighteen year period,
of whom a substantial number were black.82 Thus, the majority's resolution of
the factual issues in Cofield appears flawed.
The second tier of the court's opinion considered the legal and policy issues
associated with extending the constitutional right to challenge jury selection pro-
75. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977); see supra note 48.
76. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977).
77. See Rose, 443 U.S. at 565; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954).
78. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 5 (quoting trial court testimony), Cofield.
79. Cofield, 77 N.C. App. at 702, 336 S.E.2d at 440-41.
80. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 5-6 (emphasis added), Cofield.
81. Rose, 443 U.S. at 571-72.
82. The Clerk of Superior Court testified that 18 individuals were selected to serve as grand
jurors each year. Trial Court Transcript at 8, Cofield. Eighteen grand jurors a year for a period of
18 years constitutes a total of 324jurors. Because Northhampton County selected a panel of 9 grand
jurors every 6 months, there was an opportunity to select 36 foremen. Although the 60% black
general population did not necessarily reflect the percentage of blacks eligible to serve as jurors, the
County Clerk testified that over the past 18 years, the composition of the venire reflected the per-
centage of blacks in the total population. Id. at 8-9.
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cedures to the designation of foremen. The court initially admitted that the
fourteenth amendment prohibits racial discrimination in the selection of grand
jury foremen, yet it concluded that "[e]ven if a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment could be found," there was no precedent for reversing an otherwise
proper conviction. 83 The majority relied on Hobby to support this proposition.
As the dissent correctly pointed out, however, these cases can be easily distin-
guished. In Cofield defendant challenged the foreman selection procedures on
both due process and equal protection grounds,84 whereas in Hobby the Court
focused solely on the due process question.85 Nothing in the Hobby decision
purported to overrule the Supreme Court's analysis in Rose, which assumed
without deciding that racial discrimination in choosing a state grand jury fore-
man violates the equal protection clause and merits a reversal of the convic-
tion.8 6 The Court in Hobby merely sought to distinguish Rose, not to repudiate
the principles therein:
Rose involved a claim brought by two Negro defendants under the
Equal Protection Clause. As members of the class allegedly excluded
from service as grand jury foremen, the Rose defendants had suffered
the injuries of stigmatization and prejudice associated with racial dis-
crimination. The Equal Protection Clause has long been held to pro-
vide a mechanism for the vindication of such claims in the context of
challenges to grand and petit juries. 87
Thus, Hobby in no way affects the equal protection concerns raised in Cofield.
The court of appeals' analysis also fails to address whether the role of the
foreman is constitutionally significant. The court implied that the foreman was
unimportant by relying on the statement in Hobby that " '[s]o long as the grand
jury itself is properly constituted, there is no risk that the appointment of any
one of its members as foreman will distort the overall composition of the array
or otherwise taint the operation of the judicial process.' "88 Even if the court in
Cofield had expressly stated, as did the Supreme Court in Hobby, that the role of
a grand jury foreman is "essentially clerical in nature" and thereby inconsequen-
tial, 89 there are serious inconsistencies in this reasoning.
The foreman is the chairperson, or presiding officer, responsible for the en-
tire conduct of the grand jury investigation. The foreman excuses other mem-
bers in emergency situations, administers the oaths, takes the votes, signs the
indictments, and communicates the desire of the grand jury to hear additional
witnesses. 90 In short, the foreman initiates and guides the critical deliberations.
Thus, the very designation by the judge that one individual will serve as foreman
differentiates that person from the other members of the grand jury in an impor-
83. Cofield, 77 N.C. App. at 702, 336 S.E.2d at 441.
84. Id. at 701, 336 S.E.2d at 440.
85. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 347.
86. Rose, 443 U.S. at 551-52 n.4.
87. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 347.
88. Cofield, 77 N.C. App. at 702, 336 S.E.2d at 441 (quoting Hobby, 468 U.S. at 348).
89. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 348.
90. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-622(d), -623(b), -623(c), -626(b), -628(c) (1983).
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tant manner. Although "[a] foreman has only one vote on the grand jury,...
the selection by the district judge might appear to the other grand jurors as a
sign of judicial favor which could endow the foreman with enhanced persuasive
influence over his or her peers." 91
In addition, if the responsibilities of a foreman are essentially ministerial in
nature, then presumably a grand juror with clerical skills would be best suited
for the position. Yet trial judges look far beyond this experience in the selection
process. District judges have testified that they typically allocate considerable
time and attention to the selection of a grand jury foreman, choosing individuals
with "good management skills, strong occupational experience, the ability to
preside, good educational background, andpersonal leadership qualities."92 One
judge has declared that the foreman should possess sufficient intellectual inde-
pendence to prevent being easily led by the prosecutor.93 If the post was truly
only clerical in nature, there would be little need to devote so much time and
effort to finding a foreman with these requisite qualities.
Finally, even if the foreman's role is inconsequential, that fact alone does
not render it devoid of constitutional significance. There is a great deal of cur-
rent debate whether the role of the grand jury itself is insignificant.94 The 1973
North Carolina Criminal Code Commission even indicated that "a clear major-
ity of the commission [believes] that the grand jury as presently constituted
serves little in the way of a truly functional purpose in the administration of
criminal justice .... -95 Nevertheless, for over a century the United States and
North Carolina Supreme Courts have held that systematic exclusion of identifi-
able groups in the selection of grand jurors constitutes a violation of the equal
protection clause.96 Refusing to inquire into a judge's process for selecting fore-
men leaves the court in the anomalous position of scrutinizing grand juror selec-
tions for equal protection violations while looking the other way when similar
challenges are raised against foreman selection procedures.
One of the policy issues that the court of appeals failed to assess in Cofield
is the prejudice to both the defendant and the criminal justice system that ema-
nates from discrimination in the selection of grand jury foremen. In a subse-
quent North Carolina decision, State v. Gary,97 the court of appeals concluded
that given the ministerial nature of the position, discrimination in the selection
of a foreman has no "prejudicial impact" on a defendant's constitutional
91. United States v. Cross, 708 F.2d 631, 637 (11th Cir. 1983).
92. Id. at 636 (emphasis added) (summarizing testimony of federal district court judges).
Although federal district court judges consider these factors, the role of both the federal and North
Carolina grand jury foreman is essentially the same. See supra notes 63, 90 and accompanying text.
Thus, North Carolina trial judges are likely to consider similar factors in selecting foremen.
93. United States v. Holman, 510 F. Supp. 1175, 1180 (N.D. Fla. 1981).
94. See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 15.2(a), at 618-20. Many critics argue that
the grand jury is a mere "rubber stamp" for the prosecutor, approving practically all indictments
brought before it by the government. Id.
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 15A, art. 31 official commentary (1983).
96. See supra notes 2 & 42 and accompanying text.
97. 78 N.C. App. 29, 337 S.E.2d 70 (1985). For a discussion of the facts of Gary, see supra note
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rights.98 The court's logic, however, is unpersuasive.
Discrimination in the selection of grand jury foremen inflicts a very real
injury on criminal defendants. As early as 1880 the Supreme Court in Strauder
noted,
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied
by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as
jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in
other respects qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by
law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race preju-
dice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.99
A defendant is entitled to have his or her case considered by a grand jury from
which no segment of the community has been improperly excluded. 10°
Although Cofield did not have an affirmative right to a black foreman on his
grand jury, he did have a legal right to at least the possibility of having a black
foreman.' 0 1 If purposeful discrimination entered into the selection process, that
possibility was nullified.
Not only is there prejudice to individual defendants, but "[i]Uegal and un-
constitutional jury selection procedures cast doubt on the integrity of the whole
judicial process. They create the appearance of bias in the decision of individual
cases, and they increase the risk of actual bias as well."'1 2 Public confidence in
the integrity of the judicial system, the law as an institution, and the concepts of
democracy and representative government diminishes whenever invidious preju-
dice seeps into the administration of justice. 10 3 The distinction between the inci-
dental role of the foreman as compared with the grand jury as a whole is
immaterial.
The principal evil lies in unlimited judicial discretion. "A judge is supposed
98. Id. at 34, 337 S.E.2d at 74.
99. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
100. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972); see also supra note 47 (discussing Peters).
101. The United States and North Carolina Supreme Courts have stated that a criminal defend-
ant has no constitutional right to be indicted or tried by any particular jury, or by a jury composed in
part of members of the defendant's race or class. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972);
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 323 (1880); State v. Perry, 250 N.C. 119, 130, 108 S.E.2d 447, 455,
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 833 (1959).
102. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1972).
103. Rose, 443 U.S. at 555-56. The Court summarized the harm to society resulting from pur-
poseful discrimination in the jury selection process:
Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the
administration ofjustice. Selection of members of a grand jury because they are of one race
and not another destroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts doubt on the integrity
of the judicial process. The exclusion from grand jury service of negroes, or any group
otherwise qualified to serve, impairs the confidence of the public in the administration of
justice. As this Court repeatedly has emphasized, such discrimination "not only violates
our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a
democratic society and a representative government." . . . The harm is not only to the
accused, indicted as he is by a jury from which a segment of the community has been
excluded. It is to society as a whole. "The injury is not limited to the defendant-there is
injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the
democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts."
Id. (citations omitted).
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to be the very embodiment of evenhanded justice." 1 4 However, if the judge
systematically excludes identifiable groups from the administration of the law, it
matters very little whether the impropriety occurred at the grand jury or fore-
man level. The injury is to the judicial process itself. Although there may be no
demonstrable harm to the defendant in selecting a foreman in a discriminatory
fashion, the improper judicial decisionmaking may extend into other areas of the
judicial proceeding.105
Finally, the majority opinion in Cofield did not consider the public policy
concerns of formulating an appropriate remedy to vindicate defendants' rights
and to discourage prejudicial foreman selection procedures. For over one hun-
dred years the traditional remedy for discrimination in the selection of grand
jurors has been to reverse the conviction and quash the indictment irrespective
of the accused's guilt or innocence.10 6 Although such a remedy exacts a heavy
social cost, the Supreme Court has reexamined and reaffirmed its commitment
to this approach on two occasions in recent years.
In Rose the Court determined that the cost to the state of reindicting and
retrying a defendant was "outweighed by the strong policy the Court consist-
ently has recognized of combating racial discrimination in the administration of
justice." 107 The Court observed that dismissal of an indictment is far less egre-
gious than remedies resorted to in other situations where constitutional rights
have been violated. In the case of an illegal search or a coerced confession, the
evidence unconstitutionally obtained is suppressed altogether.10 8 Dismissing an
indictment, however, does not render a defendant immune from subsequent re-
indictment and reprosecution. In the ensuing prosecution, the government re-
mains free to use the proof it initially introduced to obtain the conviction. 10 9
Finally, the Court recognized that even though alternative remedies exist, they
are ineffectual in discouraging purposeful discrimination in the grand jury
context. 110
104. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 353 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall detailed the potential for prejudicial error:
[It is unlikely that a judge who engages in racist and sexist appointment practices will
confine his prejudicial attitudes and actions to the area of foreman selection. More likely is
that the presence of unconstitutional discrimination in that area is but a portion of a wide-
spread region of tainted decisionmaking.
Furthermore, by allocating authority within the grand jury venire on the basis of race
and sex, the judge who assumably discriminated against Negroes and women helped to
perpetuate well-known and vicious stereotypes that our society has been struggling to
erase. To denigrate the significance of the judge's violation by characterizing its effect as
"minimal and incidental" exposes the judiciary to justified charges of hypocrisy.
Id. at 352-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. See supra notes 2-3, 42-43 and accompanying text.
107. Rose, 443 U.S. at 558.
108. See id. at 557-58.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1982) makes it a federal crime to exclude citi-
zens from service on grand and petit juries on account of race. It recognized, however, that prosecu-
tions under this statute "have been rare and they are not under the control of the class members and
the courts." Id. at 558. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that "[c]ivil actions, expensive to main-
tain and lengthy, have not often been used." Id.
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Similarly, in Vasquez v. Hillery 1 ' the Court reasoned that dismissal of an
indictment is not "disproportionate to the evil that it seeks to deter."' 12 In 1962
a California grand jury indicted Hillery for first-degree murder, and subse-
quently he was convicted. After unsuccessfully pursuing appeals and collateral
relief in the state courts for the next sixteen years, Hillery filed a habeas corpus
petition in the federal courts. 113 On certiorari the Supreme Court confronted
the practical realities of retrying a defendant over a quarter of a century after his
alleged crime was committed. In such a situation many key witnesses may have
died or moved away, and evidence may have deteriorated or been lost. Never-
theless, the Court determined that overturning the conviction was "the only ef-
fective remedy for this violation .... If grand jury discrimination becomes a
thing of the past, no conviction will ever again be lost on account of it." 114
Thus, given the seriousness and similarity of the discrimination, quashing the
indictment is an appropriate means for discouraging purposeful discrimination
in the selection of grand jury foremen.
In a case of first impression, the North Carolina Court of Appeals chose to
deny relief for a claim of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury
foremen. The court, however, has misperceived the nature of-the constitutional
violation. That purposeful discrimination occurs in the selection of a foreman as
opposed to a grand juror makes little difference. The injury is to the judicial
process itself. The result undermines the public's confidence in the integrity of
the judicial system, denies criminal defendants the right to fair and representa-
tive treatment in the jury room, and perpetuates racial and other forms of dis-
crimination in the administration of the law. To ensure every criminal
defendant the right to a trial free from the taint of racial prejudice, the North
Carolina Supreme Court should reverse the court of appeals and extend the con-
stitutional right to challenge discriminatory jury selection procedures to the con-
text of grand jury foremen.
BARRY LYNN CREECH
111. 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986).
112. Id. at 623.
113. Id. at 619-20.
114. Id. at 623.
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In re Truesdell: North Carolina Adopts Two New and
Conflicting Standards for Sterilization of
Mentally Retarded Persons
Sterilizing mentally retarded people as a means of race purification came
into vogue in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century.1 In the first
half of the twentieth century, the practice gained widespread popularity, and a
majority of states passed statutes allowing compulsory sterilization of the men-
tally retarded. 2 In recent years, the development of scientific evidence discredit-
ing sterilization as a means of race purification and an expanded view of the
rights of mentally retarded people have led most of these states to repeal their
sterilization statutes. 3 Among the few compulsory sterilization statutes still in
existence is North Carolina General Statutes section 35, article 7,4 which em-
powers North Carolina courts to authorize the sterilization of mentally retarded
persons on the basis of certain compelling state interests.5
The application of this statute was challenged most recently in In re Trues-
dell.6 In Truesdell the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the court of ap-
peals' application of an additional standard designed to protect the procreative
rights of the mentally retarded. The new standard requires proof that sexual
activity without the use of contraception is likely before sterilization can be au-
thorized.7 The court also held, for the first time, that when a court reviews a
sterilization petition, some consideration of the best interests of the retarded per-
son is constitutionally required.8
This Note examines the reasoning that underlies the new standard and the
practical difficulties which may result from a strict construction of that stan-
dard. The Note identifies unanswered questions about the application of North
Carolina's standards and analyzes the conflict that exists between the best inter-
est analysis the supreme court described in Truesdell and the state's interests
analysis required by the sterilization statute. The Note concludes that the legis-
lature should reconsider involuntary sterilization in light of current understand-
ing of the scientific and constitutional issues involved and rewrite the statute so
that sterilization decisions are based solely on the interests of the retarded
person.
In 1977 the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services (DSS) in-
stituted an action seeking sterilization of Sophia Renee Truesdell pursuant to
1. See infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
2. Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 591, 594
(1966).
3. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to -50 (1984).
5. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
6. 313 N.C. 421, 329 S.E.2d 630 (1985), aff'g 63 N.C. App. 258, 304 S.E.2d 793 (1983),
7. Id. at 429, 329 S.E.2d at 635.
8. Id. at 430, 329 S.E.2d at 635-36.
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North Carolina's sterilization statute.9 Truesdell, a severely retarded woman
with a mental age of three to five years and an I.Q. of approximately 30, was
eighteen years old at the time of trial.10 Truesdell's deficiencies rendered her
unable to provide for her own basic needs, such as shopping, cooking, and per-
sonal hygiene. As a result, she was unable to survive without significant assist-
ance from others. Her condition was not likely to improve materially over
time.11 Truesdell was constantly under the supervision of others, 12 and she had
displayed no significant sexual behavior at any time prior to the trial. 13
DSS petitioned for Truesdel's sterilization pursuant to the sterilization
statute14 on the grounds that "because of a physical, mental, or nervous disease
or deficiency which is not likely to materially improve, the respondent would
probably be unable to care for a child or children." 15 DSS alleged that it
brought the action pursuant to its duty under North Carolina General Statutes
section 35-3916 because "sterilization would be in the public good and in the best
interests of the mental, moral, and physical improvement of the respondent.'
17
The trial court found as a matter of law that Truesdell was a mentally retarded
person subject to the sterilization statute, that she suffered from a mental disease
not likely to improve materially which rendered her unable to care for children,
and that sterilization would be in her best interests.18 Nevertheless, the trial
court concluded that the decision of the Federal District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina in North Carolina Association for Retarded Children
v. North Carolina 19 precluded it from allowing sterilization absent a showing
that respondent was likely to engage in sexual activity without the use of contra-
ception.20 The court held that the evidence was insufficient to show that Trues-
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to -50 (1984).
10. Truesdell, 313 N.C. at 423, 329 S.E.2d at 631.
11. In re Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. 258, 260, 304 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1983), aff'd, 313 N.C. 421,
329 S.E.2d 630 (1985).
12. Id. at 260-61, 304 S.E.2d at 795. Truesdell suffered from "a severe impairment of adaptive
behavior including basic social skills" and some degree of psycho-motor impairment which caused
her to walk with an unsteady gait. Id. The court presumed that she was fertile on the grounds that
she experienced regular menstruation. Id.
13. Id. at 261, 304 S.E.2d at 796. Truesdell's foster parent testified that she had seen her
daughter rub her genital area on some occasions in the past, but that she had gotten her to stop most
of this behavior. Truesdell's instructors reported that she was withdrawn and shy and had never
initiated any physical contact with any members of the opposite sex. Id. Another client at the
Center for Human Development which she attended viewed her as his girlfriend and had sometimes
put his arm around her, but he was described as being totally unaware of sexuality or the significance
of the act. Id. at 284, 304 S.E.2d at 809.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-43 (1984).
15. Truesdell, 313 N.C. at 422, 329 S.E.2d at 631.
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-39 (1984). The statute imposes a duty on the director of social
services to petition for sterilization whenever any of a list of circumstances exist. See infra note 70
and accompanying text.
17. Truesdell, 313 N.C. at 422, 329 S.E.2d at 631.
18. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 263, 304 S.E.2d at 797.
19. 420 F. Supp. 451 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (upholding the constitutionality of the North Carolina
sterilization statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to -50 (1984), and construing the statute to require
that petitioner show a likelihood respondent will engage in sexual activity without using
contraception).
20. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 263, 304 S.E.2d at 797.
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dell was likely to engage in sexual activity21 and declined to authorize
sterilization.2 2
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.23
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court's application of the standard set
forth in North Carolina Association for Retarded Children,24 which construed
section 35-43 to require that the petitioner show "by clear, strong and convinc-
ing evidence" that:
[t]here is a substantial likelihood that the respondent will voluntarily
or otherwise engage in sexual activity likely to cause impregnation;
AND
[t]he respondent is unable or unwilling to control procreation by alter-
native birth control or contraceptive methods, including, but not lim-
ited to, supervision, education, and training .... 25
The court of appeals was persuaded by the reasoning of the federal district
court that "it must have been the sense of the legislature to require only that
which is necessary."'26 The court reasoned that sexual activity and contraceptive
irresponsibility must be demonstrated before sterilization could be required be-
cause no likelihood exists that a person will become a parent, fit or unfit, unless
that person is sexually active.27
21. Id. at 263, 304 S.E.2d at 796.
22. Id. at 263, 304 S.E.2d at 797.
23. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding, but remanded the case for entry of
findings of fact consistent with its opinion concerning best interests, and inability to use other forms
of birth control. Id. at 292, 304 S.E.2d at 813.
24. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children, 420 F. Supp. at 456.
25. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 279, 304 S.E.2d at 806. The court noted that the petitioner must
also show:
(1) That the respondent is a mentally ill or retarded person subject to the sterilization
statutes (Art. 7, supra);
a. has a physical, mental or nervous disease or deficiency,
b. the disease or deficiency is not likely to materially improve, and
c. the respondent is likely to procreate a genetically defective child, or
d. would probably be unable to care for a child or children; AND
(2) The respondent is physically capable of procreation. Where, however, the respondent
has reached sexual maturity, the court may presume fertility, absent medical evidence to
the contrary; AND...
(5) That the proposed method of sterilization entails the least invasion of the body of the
respondent. In other words, the proposed surgical intervention is the least intrusive and
least burdensome method for sterilization of the respondent.
Id, The court also held that a court must consider and make findings relative to the possibility that a
female respondent will experience trauma or psychological damage if she becomes pregnant and
gives birth and the possibility that the respondent, male or female, will suffer psychological damage
from the sterilization operation. Id.
26. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children, 420 F. Supp. at 457.
27. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 278, 304 S.E.2d at 805. The court noted that in formulating
standards, it had relied on standards set forth in jurisdictions where courts have been called upon to
authorize sterilization in the absence of statutory guidelines. See Wyatt v. Anderholt, 368 F. Supp.
1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974); In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); Wentzel v. Montgomery
General Hosp. Inc., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 1147 (1983); In re
Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981); In re
Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980) (en bane); In re Guardianship of
Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981). The court stated that in these cases a determi-
nation that sexual activity was likely was required as a condition for sterilization. Truesdell, 63 N.C.
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The court of appeals viewed the decision of the federal district court, which
required a likelihood of sexual activity that could lead to impregnation, as hav-
ing been "reached to avoid an infirmity under the federal constitution." 28 Simi-
larly, the court considered the standards it created in Truesdell to be
constitutionally mandated.2 9
The court also addressed the trial court's finding that sterilization served
Truesdell's best interests. The court stated that any finding that sterilization is
in the best interests of the respondent necessarily would include a finding that
the respondent is sexually active and that no less drastic means of contraception
would be effective. 30 Because the evidence presented was insufficient to show
that Truesdell was likely to be sexually active, the court of appeals ruled that
sterilization was not in her best interests.31 Truesdell's best interests were not,
however, the controlling factor in the court of appeals' decision. Despite its
reliance on the standards created by other jurisdictions, 32 the court found it
"doubtful whether compulsory sterilization could be ordered on the basis of un-
defined 'best interests' in view of the fundamental interest at stake," and
grounded its decision on its interpretation of the statute.33
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' deci-
App. at 280-281, 304 S.E.2d at 807. The court's analysis of the cases was, however, somewhat
exaggerated. See infra note 115.
28. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 276, 304 S.E.2d at 804. The constitutionality of sterilization
performed under the North Carolina sterilization statute rests on the state's compelling interest in
preventing the procreation of children by a person who probably would be unable to care for chil-
dren, or of children who probably would have serious diseases or deficiencies. In re Moore, 289 N.C.
95, 102-03, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (1976). For further discussion of the constitutional justification for
the statute as expressed in Moore, see infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
29. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 290, 304 S.E.2d at 812. The Truesdell court found that for the
state to have a compelling interest in sterilization, the threat to its interests represented by the person
"against whom the State seeks to act" must be an immediate one. The required immediate threat
does not exist when the respondent is not likely to engage in sexual activity without the use of
contraception. Id. at 277, 304 S.E.2d at 805.
30. The court of appeals stated:
"Moreover, for purposes of instituting sterilization proceedings under G.S. 35-39, a deter-
mination that a proposed sterilization is in the respondent's best interests must include a
determination that the respondent is sexually active and that no temporary measure for
birth control or contraception will adequately meet the respondent's needs, in addition to
the statutory grounds regarding defective offspring and parental unfitness."
Id. at 289, 304 S.E.2d at 812.
31. Id. at 291, 304 S.E.2d at 809.
32. See supra note 27.
33. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 289, 304 S.E.2d at 812. The court based its opinion on its
observation that, although § 35-39 lists a determination that sterilization is in the retarded person's
best interests among the situations giving rise to DSS's duty to petition for sterilization, see infra
note 70, § 35-43, which sets out the specific findings a court must make before authorizing steriliza-
tion, makes no reference at all to the interests of the person to be sterilized.
If the judge of the district court shall find from the evidence that the person alleged to
be subject to this section is subject to it and that because of a physical, mental, or nervous
disease or deficiency which is not likely to materially improve, the person would probably
be unable to care for a child or children, or because the person would be likely, unless
sterilized, to procreate a child or children which probably would have serious physical,
mental, or nervous diseases or deficiencies, he shall enter an order and judgment authoriz-
ing.., the operation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-43 (1984).
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sion 34 and held that a petitioner seeking sterilization must meet certain stan-
dards beyond those specifically required by the statute.3 5 Like the court of
appeals, the supreme court found the reasoning in North Carolina Association for
Retarded Children persuasive and specifically approved the requirement of clear,
strong, and convincing evidence that a substantial likelihood exists that the re-
spondent will engage in sexual activity likely to cause impregnation before steril-
ization may be authorized.36
The supreme court also addressed the need for courts to consider the best
interests of mentally retarded individuals when ruling on petitions for steriliza-
tion. The court stated that it "[agreed] with the court of appeals that.., some
minimal 'best interests' standards are constitutionally required."' 37 The court
pointed out, however, that unlike the courts of jurisdictions which have no stat-
ute authorizing sterilization, upon which the court of appeals relied in formulat-
ing "best interests" standards, North Carolina courts are constrained to
interpret an existing statute.3 8 "Nevertheless," the court stated, it was "per-
suaded and influenced by the standards promulgated by the states in other juris-
dictions" 39 and upheld the standards created by the court of appeals.40 In dicta,
the court expanded the court of appeals' standards by stating that they are not to
serve as an exclusive list and that a trial judge may exercise his or her discretion
to consider other factors which he or she finds reflective of the respondent's best
interests. 4 1 The court held that because insufficient evidence existed to prove
that Truesdell was in imminent danger for her life, or that her health would be
severely jeopardized unless sterilization was performed immediately, steriliza-
tion was impermissible. 42
The use of selective breeding to improve the human race has been advo-
cated since at least the time of Plato's Republic.43 In the late 19th century,
inspired by the popular theory of social Darwinism and the rediscovery of Men-
34. Truesdell, 313 N.C. at 432, 329 S.E.2d at 636. The court modified in part, disapproving of
the court of appeals' mischaracterization of § 35-43 as authorizing sterilization if" 'the respondent
is likely to procreate a genetically defective child.'" Id. at 432 n.2, 329 S.E.2d at 636 n.2 (quoting
Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 279, 304 S.E.2d at 806).
35. Id. at 430, 329 S.E.2d at 635-36.
36. Id. at 429, 329 S.E.2d at 635.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 430, 329 S.E.2d at 635. For a list of the cases the court identified as sources of these
standards, see supra note 27.
40. Truesdell, 313 N.C. at 430, 329 S.E.2d at 635-36. In addition to the cases whose standards
the court of appeals claimed its standards are substantially identical to, see cases cited supra note 27,
the court cited Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn 1978); In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607
(Alaska 1981); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 414 A.2d 541 (1980); Cook v. State, 9 Or. App. 224,
495 P.2d 768 (1972).
41. Truesdell, 313 N.C. at 430-31, 329 S.E.2d at 636. The court stated that examples of factors
"which can be relied upon by the trial judge when making specific findings of fact regarding the
respondent's best interests" can be found in the cases upon which it and the court of appeals relied.
Id. For a list of these cases, see supra notes 27 & 40.
42. Truesdell, 313 N.C. at 431, 329 S.E.2d at 636.
43. R. MACKLIN & W. GAYLIN, MENTAL RETARDATION AND STERILIZATION 63 (1981);
Vukovich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal Ethical, and Social Issues of Eugenics,
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189, 189 (1971).
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delian genetics, a eugenics movement began to develop in the United States.44
The term "eugenics" is derived from a Greek word meaning "well born."' 45 Sir
Francis Galton, who coined the term, defined eugenics as "'the study of agen-
cies under social control that may improve or impair future generations...
either physically or mentally.' "46 The eugenics movement was based upon the
idea that defects such as mental retardation, mental illness, and epilepsy, are
genetically inherited. Its followers sought to prevent such genetically "inferior"
persons from reproducing. 47 Originally, castration was the only method avail-
able for sterilization. The development in the 1890s of safe methods of steriliza-
tion that did not destroy sexual desire or ability added impetus to the eugenics
movement.
48
The first sterilization statute to take effect in the United States was enacted
by Indiana in 1907.49 By the end of the 1920s, the eugenics movement had
reached its peak. In 1921 approximately 3,900 sterilizations had been performed
under existing sterilization statutes.50 By 1930, 28 states had passed involuntary
sterilization statutes51 and 20,000 sterilizations were performed by 1935.52
The greatest victory for the eugenics movement occurred in Buck v. Bell,53
a landmark case in which the United States Supreme Court, upholding the appli-
cation of Virginia's sterilization statute, made the famous statement, "three gen-
erations of imbeciles are enough."'54 This decision has been severely criticized
44. See Ferster, supra note 2, at 591-92; Sherlock& Sherlock, Sterilizing the Mentally Retarded:
Constitutional, Statutory, and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C.L. REv. 943, 945 (1982); Comment, Sterili-
zation of the Developmentally Disabled: Shedding Some Myth-Conceptions, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv.
599, 602-06 (1981). For a discussion of the development of eugenics and the social consequences of
hereditarian views, see M. HALLER, EUGENICS (1963).
45. Ferster, supra note 2, at 591; Comment, supra note 44, at 602 n.14.
46. Ferster, supra note 2, at 591 (citing A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 357,
357-58 (2d ed. 1949)); see also Comment, supra note 44, at 603 (discussing the roots of the eugenics
movement).
47. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization
of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995, 998-99 (1977); Ferster, supra note 2, at 592; Comment,
supra note 44, at 603.
48. Dr. Harry Sharp developed the surgical technique of vasectomy in 1889. Ferster, supra
note 2, at 592. Sharp performed approximately 700 sterilization operations at the Indiana State
Reformatory before Indiana passed a statute authorizing sterilization. Comment, supra note 44, at
603. Scalpingectomy, a surgical method of sterilizing females, was developed in France at about the
same time. Id.
49. Act of March 9, 1907, ch. 215, 1907 Ind. Acts 377 (held unconstitutional in Williams v.
Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2 (1921)), repealed by Act of February 23, 1963, ch. 17, 1963 Ind.
Acts 12.
50. Ferster, supra note 2, at 594.
51. Ferster, supra note 2, at 595. This pattern continued despite the fact that sterilization stat-
utes undergoing judicial review prior to 1925 were uniformly declared unconstitutional. Id. at 593.
Some were struck down on equal protection grounds. See Haynes v. Lapeer, 201 Mich. 138, 166
N.W. 938 (1918); Smith v. Bd. of Examiners, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (Sup. Ct. 1913); In re Thom-
son, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638, afd mem., 185 A.D. 902, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (1918). Others failed
because of procedural inadequacies. See Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2 (1921); Brewer
v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933). For a survey of early eugenic sterilization statutes
including state by state statistical information, see H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENIC STmRILIZATION (1926).
52. Comment, Sterilization Petitions: Developing Judicial Guidelines, 44 MONT. L.R. 127, 128
(1983).
53. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
54. Id. at 207. Respondent was a feebleminded woman who was the daughter of a feeble-
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because the scientific premise upon which it rests-that mental retardation oc-
curs primarily as a result of genetically inferior parents-has been discredited.55
It has been established that a significant percentage of mental deficiencies are
caused by nonhereditary factors such as trauma and environment5 6 and that
with the exception of a few specific diseases, mentally retarded parents are not
significantly more likely to bear mentally retarded offspring than nonretarded
parents. 57 As a result of these findings, in recent years several states have re-
pealed their sterilization statutes.58 In other states, courts have found jurisdic-
tion to order sterilization without the benefit of statutory guidance when acting
in the best interests of retarded individuals. 59
North Carolina has long been among the states most active in sterilizing the
mentally retarded. 60 North Carolina's first statute authorizing involuntary ster-
minded mother, and was herself the mother of an allegedly feebleminded daughter. The United
States Supreme Court held Virginia's sterilization statute to be a reasonable exercise of the state's
police power and not a violation of either the due process or equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment. Id. at 205-08.
55. Serious doubt about the scientific validity of the theory that mental diseases generally are
passed on through heredity has existed for a long time. The Committee of the American Association
for the Investigation of Eugenic Sterilization concluded in 1936 that "[o]n the whole, eugenics re-
ceives scant support on any scientific basis from genetics" and that "any law concerning sterilization
passed in the United States under the present state of knowledge should be voluntary and regulatory
rather than compulsory." THE COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATION FOR
THE INVESTIGATION OF EUGENIC STERILIZATION REPORT 69, 78 (1936).
For an analysis of the validity of eugenic theory in light of modem genetic knowledge, see
Murdock, Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 917,
926-28 (1974); Note, Eugenic Sterilization: 4 Scientific Analysis, 46 DEN. L.J. 631 (1969) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, A Scientific Analysis].
For an argument that the North Carolina Supreme Court's reliance on Buck is cause for ques-
tioning the validity of Moore, see Note, North Carolina Compulsory Sterilization Statute Held Consti-
tutionalAgainst Challenge That It Constituted an Unlawful Invasion of Privacy. In re Sterilization of
Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976), 8 TEXAs TECH L. REv. 436, 444 (1974).
56. Note, A ScientficAnalysis, supra note 55, at 639-41. Of the two broad categories of mental
deficiency recognized, deficiencies in one category-psychotic and neurotic illnesses-are considered
developmental or environmental in origin. Id.
57. The child of a parent who is afflicted with a genetic disease that is carried in dominant
genes, such as Down's Syndrome, has a 50% chance of inheriting the disease. Murdock, supra note
55, at 926. A child whose parents carry a disease that is manifested only in recessive genes can
inherit the disease only if both parents carry the same defective trait. Id. "Typically, abnormal and
especially lethal characteristics are recessive in nature .... Note, A Scientfic Analysis, supra note
55, at 642. Therefore, in the majority of cases, it is impossible for the child of a mentally retarded
parent to inherit the parent's deficiencies.
It has been estimated that there are ten to thirty times more carriers of genetic diseases than
persons actually afflicted with them. Murdock, supra note 55, at 927 (quoting Bligh, Sterilization
and Mental Retardation, 51 A.B.A. J. 1059, 1062 (1965)). Over 80% of all mentally retarded chil-
dren are born to nonretarded parents. Id. at 926 (citing Gamble, What Proportion of Mental Defi-
ciency is Preventable by Sterilization?, 57 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 123, 124 (1952)). Thus, for a
eugenic program to be effective, it has been estimated that at least 10% of the population would have
to be sterilized. Murdock, supra note 55, at 927 (quoting Bligh, Sterilization and Mental Retarda-
tion, 51 A.B.A. J. 1059, 1062 (1965)).
58. One author counted ten states (Alabama, Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana, Maine,
Michigan, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Virginia) that repealed their sterilization
statutes between 1973 and 1983. Comment, supra note 52, at 129 & n.28.
59. See cases cited supra note 27.
60. Writing in 1950, one commentator described North Carolina as "a State with public health
officials, social agencies, and public institutions favoring [eugenic sterilization]." Dickinson, Fore-
word to M. WOODSIDE, STERILIZATION IN NORTH CAROLINA at vii (1950).
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ilization of mentally disabled persons was passed in 1929.61 Forty-nine people
were sterilized in accordance with the statute before it was declared unconstitu-
tional. 62 In 1933 the North Carolina Supreme Court held the statute violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because it failed to provide
notice or a hearing to persons subjected to sterilization. 63 A new statute was
enacted shortly thereafter, containing provisions for notice and creating the
State Board of Eugenics to hear contested cases. 64 Under this statute steriliza-
tions were carried out at a brisk pace. In 1948 North Carolina ranked second in
the country in the number of sterilizations performed. 65 In 1963 North Caro-
lina performed 240 sterilizations, which comprised more than fifty percent of all
reported sterilizations in the United States. 66
The current North Carolina statute went into effect in 1975.67 It applies to
both institutionalized and noninstitutionalized mentally retarded persons. 68
Under the statute, county directors of social services are authorized to petition
for sterilization operations. 69 In addition, a director has an affirmative duty to
petition for sterilization whenever he or she believes that sterilization would be
in the best interests of the retarded individual or would serve the public good, or
whenever the retarded person would be likely to procreate a child who would
have serious deficiencies or would be unable to care for children.70 A hearing is
available at respondent's request and procedural safeguards exist to protect the
due process rights of retarded individuals. 7 1 The trial court must order steriliza-
61. Act of Feb. 18, 1929, cl. 34, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 28, repealed by Act of April 5, 1933, ch.
224, § 21, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345, 352.
62. M. WOODSIDE, supra note 60, at 9.
63. Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638 (1933).
64. Act of Apr. 5, 1933, ch. 224, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 345 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-
36 to -57 (Michie 1933)).
65. M. WOODSIDE, supra note 60, at 21. While this statute was in effect, sterilizations were
performed primarily with the consent of the mentally retarded person or a relative. Id. at 13; Fer-
ster, supra note 2, at 601 n.35.
66. Note, In re Moore: The Sound and the Fury and the Scalpel, 8 N.C. CENT. 307, 311 (1977).
67. Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 1281, 1973 N.C. SEss. LAws 458 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 35-36 to -50 (1984)).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. at §§ 35-36, -37 (1984).
69. Id.
70. The director must petition for sterilization:
(1) When in his opinion it is for the best interest of the mental, moral or physical im-
provement of the patient, resident of an institution, or noninstitutional individual, that he
or she be sterilized.
(2) When in his opinion it is for the public good that such patient, resident of an institu-
tion, or noninstitutional individual, be sterilized.
(3) When in his opinion such patient resident of an institution or noninstitutional individ-
ual would be likely, unless sterilized to procreate a child or children who would have a
tendency to serious physical, mental, or nervous disease or deficiency; or, because of a
physical, mental, or nervous disease or deficiency which is not likely to materially improve,
the person would be unable to care for a child or children.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-39 (1984).
As originally enacted, the statute contained a fourth subsection: "when the next of kin or legal
guardian of the retarded person requests that he file the petition," but this subsection was held
unconstitutional, North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children, 420 F. Supp. at 455-56, and later
repealed. Act of April 11, 1974, ch. 1281, 1974 N.C. Sess. Laws 458 (repealed by Act of March 7,
1981, ch. 102, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 66).
71. The petitioner must give notice to the respondent and to a court-appointed guardian ad
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tion if it finds that the respondent is subject to the statute and that:
because of a physical, mental, or nervous disease or deficiency which is
not likely to materially improve, the person would probably be unable
to care for a child or children, or because the person would be likely,
unless sterilized, to procreate a child or children which would have
serious physical, mental, or nervous diseases or deficiencies.
72
The constitutionality of the statute was first tested before the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in In re Moore.73 In Moore the respondent challenged the
statute on the grounds that it denied him procedural and substantive due pro-
cess.74 The court, relying on Eisenstadt v. Baird,75 recognized the right of an
individual to be free from governmental intrusion into the decision whether to
bear children.76 The court noted, however, that this right is not unqualified and
must be weighed against state interests. 77 Although limitation of such a funda-
mental right can be justified only by a countervailing compelling state interest, 78
the public welfare may take precedence over an individual's procreative rights. 79
The court held that North Carolina's interest in protecting unborn children8 0
and in preventing the procreation of children who will become a burden on the
state was sufficiently compelling to justify sterilization.8
The Moore court also established the burden of proof that the state must
meet before sterilization can be granted. The court noted that the statute lacked
litem. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-40, -43 (1984). The respondent may request a hearing at which he or
she will have the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine the petitioner's witnesses.
72. Id. §§ 35-43.
73. 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976) (petition for sterilization of a minor on grounds that he
would be likely to procreate a child or children who would have serious deficiencies).
74. Id. at 97-98, 221 S.E.2d at 309. The respondent also challenged the statute's constitutional-
ity on the grounds that it denied retarded people equal protection and the right to cross-examine the
petitioner's witnesses, that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and that it was vague and
arbitrary. Id.
75. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts statute prohibiting dissemination of contraceptives to
unmarried persons held an unconstitutional denial of equal protection).
76. Moore, 289 N.C. at 102, 221 S.E.2d at 311-12.
77. Id.
78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-155 (1973).
79. Moore, 289 N.C. at 103, 221 S.E.2d at 312 (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)).
80. "[W]hen there is overwhelming evidence... that a potential parent will be unable to pro-
vide a proper environment for a child because of his own mental illness or mental retardation, the
state has sufficient interest to order sterilization." Moore, 289 N.C. at 103, 221 S.E.2d at 312 (quot-
ing Cook v. State, 9 Or. App. 224, 230, 495 P.2d 769, 771-72 (1972)).
81. The court identified the welfare of the respondent as being among its "chief concerns,"
leading some commentators to conclude the court meant that the state's concern for the best inter-
ests of the retarded person is among the compelling state interests that provide the constitutional
justification for sterilization. See Note, Compulsory Sterilization of the Mentally Ill and Retarded:
In re Sterilization of Moore, 30 Sw. L.J. 775, 779 (1976). The court specifically stated that the state's
interests in the welfare of the potential child and in preventing the creation of burdens upon the state
"rise to the level of a compelling state interest" and therefore, are sufficient to justify sterilization.
Moore, 289 N.C. at 103, 221 S.E.2d at 312-13. In contrast, when discussing the interests of the
retarded person, the court merely pointed out that sterilization "at certain times may be in the best
interests of that individual" and that the state "may only be providing for the welfare of the individ-
ual . . . " Id. at 103-104, 221 S.E.2d at 312-13 (emphasis added). Although the interests of the
retarded person may sometimes coincide with the state's interests, there is no suggestion that sterili-
zation should not be ordered in cases where it does not.
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any language specifying the required burden of proof.82 The court determined
that the general assembly had intended to provide sufficient safeguards to pre-
vent misuse of the statute, and to give effect to that intent the court held that
clear, strong, and convincing evidence is required before authorization for steril-
ization may be granted.83
The next challenge to the sterilization statute came in North Carolina Asso-
ciation for Retarded Children v. State of North Carolina.84 A three judge panel
of the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
considered whether the statute created an arbitrary and capricious classification
in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.85
The district court found that, although only rarely would a competent doctor
recommend involuntary sterilization, extreme cases do exist in which it is possi-
ble to predict with substantial accuracy that the offspring of a mentally retarded
person would also be retarded or that the person would be incapable of discharg-
ing the responsibilities of parenthood. 86 Consequently, the court found that
there are "rare and unusual cases [in which] it can be medically determined that
involuntary sterilization is in the best interest of either the mentally retarded
person or the state or both" 87 and upheld the statute.8 8
The court reasoned that "it must have been the sense of the legislature to
require only that which is necessary" 89 and that sterilization is unnecessary un-
82. Moore, 289 N.C. at 108, 221 S.E.2d at 315.
83. Id.
84. 420 F. Supp. 451 (1976). This case was severed from a significantly larger lawsuit involving
a broad range of statutes relating to the treatment, training, and education of mentally retarded
children. The constitutionality of the sterilization statute as applied to mentally retarded children
was the only issue presented.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
86. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children, 420 F. Supp. at 454-55.
87. Id. at 455.
88. The court struck down subsection four, which imposed a duty upon county directors of
DSS to petition for sterilization at the request of the next of kin or legal guardian of the retarded
person, holding it an unconstitutional, arbitrary, and capricious delegation of power. Id. at 456. For
the language of subsection four, see supra note 70. The court reasoned that placing such complete
confidence in all guardians is unwarranted. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children, 420 F.
Supp. at 456.
In one recent study, 64% of the parents of mentally retarded people surveyed believed they
should be allowed to make decisions about sterilization for their children without intrusion by the
state. Wolfe & Zarfas, Parents'Attitudes Toward Sterilization of Their Mentally Retarded Children,
87 Am. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 122, 127 (1982). Parents generally support sterilization of their
retarded children-one study found sterilization to be favored by 71% of the parents surveyed-and
tend to pressure their children's guardians to aquiesce to it. Id. at 125.
Some courts have recognized, however, that parents' interests may conflict with those of their
children. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children, 420 F. Supp. at 456; In re Guardianship of
Hayes, 93 Wash. 228, 236, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (1980); In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 553, 307
N.W.2d 881,897 (1981). In the words of one author, "[d]iminished worry, convenience, a wish to be
relieved of responsibility for close supervision, and inability to deal with a difficult problem may
cause even the most well-intentioned parent to act against the retarded person's best interests."
Comment, Protection of the Mentally Retarded Individual's Right to Choose Sterilization: The Effect
of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 12 CAP. U.L. REv. 413, 418 (1983); accord Mur-
dock, supra note 55, at 932-33. But see Moore, 289 N.C. at 109, 221 S.E.2d at 316 (respondent's
mother is unquestionably in a position to know what is best for the future of her child).
89. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children, 420 F. Supp. at 457.
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less there is a likelihood of impregnation. 90 Accordingly, it construed section
35-43 to require that, before sterilization may be authorized, the petitioner must
show that the respondent "is likely to engage in sexual activity without utilizing
contraceptive devices and is therefore likely to impregnate or become
impregnated." 9 1
The North Carolina sterilization statute was next construed in In re John-
son.92 In Johnson the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the problem
of how to establish the state's burden of proof when it seeks to sterilize a re-
tarded individual on the ground that he or she would be unable to care for a
child. The court held that "a presumption of unfitness founded solely on retar-
dation is unwarranted."' 93 Instead, "[t]he petitioner has the burden of proving at
least probable inability to provide a reasonable domestic environment for the
child."'94 Evidence that, in addition to being mentally retarded, the respondent
"had exhibited emotional immaturity, the absence of a sense of responsibility, a
lack of patience with children, and [had engaged in] continuous nightly adven-
tures with boyfriends followed by daily sleep and bed rest" was held sufficient to
demonstrate her inability to provide a reasonable domestic environment. 95
Truesdell is a milestone in the history of sterilization in North Carolina.
The new standards, which require proof that sexual activity is likely to occur
and consideration of the respondent's best interests before sterilization may be
authorized, are likely to have a significant impact on the number of sterilizations
performed in North Carolina. 96 The exact nature of that impact is as yet un-
clear, however, because the decision raises several unanswered questions.
The requirement that the petitioner show the respondent is likely to engage
in sexual activity without using contraceptives raises the issue of how imminent
the likelihood of such activity must be before sterilization is justified. The
supreme court did not address this issue directly in Truesdell. The court of
appeals, however, interpreted the rule established in Shelton v. Tucker,97 which
held that a state may not act to interfere with fundamental rights when a less
90. Id. at 456. The court of appeals in Truesdell stated that the district court adopted this
construction to prevent the statute from being unconstitutional and agreed with the district court's
reasoning. See Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 276-77, 304 S.E.2d at 804-05.
91. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children, 420 F. Supp. at 456.
92. 45 N.C. App. 649, 263 S.E.2d 805 (1980).
93. Id. at 653, 263 S.E.2d at 809. Many mentally retarded persons are capable of being ade-
quate parents. See infra note 128.
94. Johnson, 45 N.C. App. at 653, 263 S.E.2d at 809.
95. Id. at 653-54, 263 S.E.2d at 809. The court also considered testimony that the respondent
had two boyfriends, one of whom wanted to marry her, had arranged to have an intrauterine device
provided by DSS removed, had already had an abortion, and was unable to comprehend that preg-
nancy could result from intercourse. Id. at 650-51, 263 S.E.2d at 807.
In Truesdell the court of appeals pointed out that it had considered these factors in Johnson and
concluded that it had already implicitly accepted the standards of North CarolinaAss'n for Retarded
Children. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 276, 304 S.E.2d at 804.
96. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 279-80, 304 S.E.2d at 806. For a list of other standards Trues-
dell set forth, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
97. 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (Arkansas statute requiring every teacher to file an annual affidavit
listing every organization to which he or she had belonged or contributed to in the past five years
was overly broad and therefore unconstitutional).
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drastic alternative is available,9 8 to require that the risk of pregnancy be "clear
and present." 99 Thus, "a compelling interest ... would seem to require that
conditions created by the party against whom the State seeks to act must create
a threat of immediate harm to that interest."'1
The court of appeals' requirement that the danger of procreation be clear
and present has the potential to render the sterilization statute completely inef-
fective. The state's interest in preventing procreation by those people subject to
the statute can be effectuated only if the state can petition for sterilization before
the danger of pregnancy becomes immediate. A strict interpretation of Trues-
dell, which would require evidence that the respondent has actually engaged in
sexual activity without the use of contraception, would make it unlikely that
sterilizations can be performed in time to prevent pregnancies. In Truesdell, for
example, the DSS filed its petition for sterilization in 1977.101 The trial court
did not rule on that petition until more than three years later.' 02 If a person is
in "clear and present" danger of being impregnated or causing impregnation, a
procedure that takes three years to implement is no remedy. If the state's inter-
est is truly sufficient to justify interference with a fundamental right, arguably it
is sufficient to justify interference at a time when it will achieve the desired
goal.' 0 3 Defining "clear and present" so as to strike the proper balance between
the state's interest in performing sterilization before pregnancy occurs and the
right of mentally retarded people to be free from an invasion of their fundamen-
tal rights is a challenge left for future courts to resolve. 1° 4
A related issue raised by the new standards concerns the nature of the evi-
dence required to show that the respondent is likely to engage in sexual activity.
The respondent's parents are the people most likely to have sufficient contact
with the respondent so as to testify concerning his or her behavior. Parents of
mentally retarded persons have interests which are not always consistent with
98. Id. at 488.
99. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 281-82, 304 S.E.2d at 807-08.
100. Id. at 277, 304 S.E.2d at 805 (citing Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416 (1983)); see also Sherlock & Sherlock, supra note 44, at 970 ("[Before sterilization a]
demonstration should be required that the retarded person is sexually active to a degree sufficient to
render procreation likely in the near future. It must be shown that procreation is now at risk, not
that the retarded person once had intercourse or may potentially have intercourse in the future.");
Note, Constitutional Law-Legislative Naivete in Involuntary Sterilization Laws, 12 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 1064, 1075 (1976) ('[S]cientific evidence belies any correspondence between statutes aimed
at mental defectives and the State interest which the North Carolina Supreme Court [in In re
Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976)] assumed was compelling.").
101. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 259, 304 S.E.2d at 794-95.
102. Id.
103. This statement does not suggest that the court erred in its holding, or that it failed to
consider the practical effect of the standard it applied. It is possible that the court intended to strike
the balance in favor of a strict immediacy requirement despite the consequences that such a rule
would produce. If the court's holding is interpreted in this way, the decision ensures that the state
interest at stake cannot be achieved and therefore casts doubt on the validity of carrying out steril-
izations under any circumstances. If the court intended to create such a strict standard, that choice
is of sufficient import that it deserved more direct treatment.
104. Courts applying a best interests analysis escape this dilemma. Under a best interests analy-
sis, sterilization is justified whenever it is in the best interests of the individual respondent involved.
Therefore, whenever sterilization is in that respondent's best interests, it is necessary.
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those of their children.105 As one commentator noted, parents of mentally re-
tarded children find "the whole area of sexuality ... immensely threatening,
disturbing, and inconvenient."10 6 As a result, their perceptions of their chil-
dren's sexual interest and behavior are not likely to be objective. Furthermore,
as a group, parents of mentally retarded children have a strong bias in favor of
sterilizing their children.10 7 Under these circumstances, basing a decision as
important as the decision whether to authorize sterilization on parents' testi-
mony about their own perceptions of the likelihood that their children will en-
gage in sexual activity is questionable. The "clear, strong, and convincing"
requirement set forth by the Truesdell court probably would not be satisfied by
such testimony.
The burden of the petitioner, who must prove by clear, strong, and convinc-
ing evidence an imminent likelihood that the respondent will engage in sexual
activity without using contraception, is a difficult burden to meet. The strin-
gency of this requirement may lead well-meaning parents and health care per-
sonnel to commit egregious invasions of the privacy of mentally retarded
persons while attempting to gather enough evidence to support a sterilization
petition. Thus, the Truesdell standards created to protect the rights of mentally
retarded persons may actually serve to promote even greater invasions of those
rights.
The most troublesome aspect of Truesdell is the court's holding "that when
the state petitions the court for a compulsory sterilization, some minimal 'best
interests' standards are constitutionally required."' 0 8 This requirement cannot
be reconciled with the language of the sterilization statute. Section 35-43 specifi-
cally commands district judges to authorize sterilization upon a finding that,
because of a physical, mental, or nervous deficiency, the respondent would prob-
ably be unable to care for a child or would be likely to procreate a child who
would have a serious deficiency.' 0 9 This statute does not allow a district court
discretion to consider the best interests of the mentally retarded person. Fur-
thermore, in upholding the statute the Moore court, although recognizing the
procreative rights of mentally retarded persons, held that the state's interests are
sufficient to take precedence over those rights." 0 Thus, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has upheld a statutory test that allows sterilization of mentally
retarded persons without regard to whether it is in their best interests.
By grafting a best interests analysis onto the existing statute, the Truesdell
court created a standard for reviewing sterilization petitions which raises more
105. See supra note 88.
106. Lottman, Sterilization of The Mentally Retarded: Who Decides?, TRIAL, April, 1982, at 61-
62.
107. See supra note 88.
108. Truesdell, 313 N.C. at 429, 329 S.E.2d at 635.
109. For the statutory language, see supra note 33. After Truesdell, a court also must find that
the respondent is likely to engage in sexual activity and is unwilling or unable to use contraception
before sterilization may be authorized. See supra text accompanying note 25.
110. Moore, 289 N.C. at 104, 221 S.E.2d at 313. Under the Moore court's analysis, a best inter-
ests analysis would be superfluous because whatever the interests of the respondent might be, the
state's interests are controlling.
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questions than it answers. These questions will arise most notably in cases in
which a court finds that the statutory test is satisfied, but that sterilization is not
in the respondent's best interests, or that sterilization is in the respondent's best
interests, but that the statutory test is not satisfied. Truesdell provides little
guidance as to which set of standards should take precedence in such cases.
The Truesdell court never suggested that the outcome of the best interests
analysis could override the statutory standards. To allow it to do so would be
tantamount to a judicial rewriting of the statute, creating a standard fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the statute's original content. The decision whether to
authorize sterilization would then rest on factors that played no role in the deci-
sion making process set out by the general assembly. Apparently, the court was
unwilling to engage in that degree of judicial legislation.
If a best interests analysis is constitutionally required, however, presumably
its result must be capable of affecting the disposition of the case. If a court is
compelled to order sterilization upon a finding that the statutory standards are
met, even though it finds that sterilization is not in the respondent's best inter-
ests, then the best interests analysis becomes an empty formality. It is difficult to
believe that a constitutionally required analysis could be incapable of affecting
the outcome of the case.
The potential for this kind of conflict existed in Truesdell itself. The trial
court found that sterilization was in Truesdell's best interests, but refused to
authorize sterilization because the statutory standards were not met.11 1 The
court of appeals dealt with this conflict by defining it out of existence. That is,
the court stated flatly that "a determination that a proposed sterilization is in the
respondent's best interests must include a determination that the respondent is
sexually active and that no temporary measure for birth control or contracep-
tion will adequately meet the respondent's needs .... ,,112 Thus, the court of
appeals avoided the conflict between a best interests analysis and the statutory
standards by defining best interests so that sterilization can be in the respon-
dent's best interests only when the statutory standards are met. The court of
appeals then applied this general rule without considering whether it held true
for the individual in question.' 13
111. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 263, 304 S.E.2d at 797. The trial court considered proof that
sexual activity is likely a required element of the statutory standards. Id.
112. Id. at 289, 304 S.E.2d at 812.
113. The issue upon which the court of appeals' decision rested was whether the statute author-
izing sterilization on the basis of the state's interests can be constitutionally applied to a respondent
when the petitioner fails to show that the respondent is likely to be sexually active. Although the
likelihood that the respondent will be sexually active is also a relevant factor in a best interests
analysis, see infra note 115, the court of appeals did not purport to apply such an analysis.
The distinction between the role that the likelihood of sexual activity plays under the statutory
standards and under a best interests analysis illustrates the fundamental difference between the two
approaches. When, as under the statutory standards, sterilization is viewed as something the state
does to a mentally retarded person in furtherance of the state's own interests, proof of sexual activity
is necessary to ensure that the state does not act against the individual unless doing so is necessitated
by a compelling state interest. See Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 279, 304 S.E.2d at 806. When, as
under a best interests analysis, sterilization is only permitted when it serves the interests of the
retarded person, no such artificial barrier is necessary. Moreover, under a best interests analysis, any
rigid requirement is inappropriate because it can only serve as a barrier preventing the retarded
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The argument that sterilization can be in a respondent's best interests only
if he or she is likely to be sexually active is controversial. 114 Furthermore, this
kind of analysis begs the question at the heart of a best interests analysis:
whether sterilization is actually in the best interests of the individual respon-
dent. 115 Determining the best interests of an individual respondent on the basis
of generalizations about the best interests of all mentally retarded people fails to
afford the respondent the opportunity to exercise his or her procreative rights,
which is the very reason for undertaking a best interests analysis.
1 16
The court of appeals' definition of best interests, however, has limited prec-
edential value. The court of appeals only considered the best interests of the
respondent in dicta, basing its decision on the constitutional requirement that
the state may not invade a fundamental right when the invasion is not necessary
to protect a compelling state interest.1 17 At the time of the court of appeals'
decision, no North Carolina court had held that a best interests analysis is con-
stitutionally required, and the court of appeals did not purport to apply such an
analysis.
The supreme court's opinion did little to clarify the best interests analysis
described by the court of appeals. By accepting without comment the court of
appeals' finding that sterilization was not in Truesdell's best interests, the
person from achieving his or her best interests. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 263 & n.9, 426 A.2d 467,
481 & n.9 (1981); see also In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 569 n.10, 432 N.E.2d 712, 722 n.10 (1982) (a
strict requirement of medical necessity is inappropriate because it may produce a result that conflicts
with the choice the respondent would make if he or she were competent).
The court of appeals' opinion of the importance of a best interests analysis in the review of
sterilization petitions is revealed by its statement that it is "doubtful whether compulsory steriliza-
tion can be ordered on the basis of undefined 'best interests' alone in view of the fundamental interest
at stake." Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 289, 304 S.E.2d at 812.
114. See infra note 136.
115. The court of appeals found support for a strict requirement that sexual activity be likely in
standards applied by courts in other jurisdictions which have considered sterilization petitions in the
absence of statutory guidelines. The court of appeals interpreted these cases as applying standards
substantially identical to those that it applied. Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. at 280-82, 304 S.E.2d at
806-07. Analysis of these cases, however, reveals that the court of appeals' interpretation does not
address the distinction between a pure best interests analysis and an analysis that is strictly bound by
a generalized rule. In In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981), the New Jersey Supreme Court
specifically rejected both North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children and a proposed requirement of
necessity. Id. at 263, 264 nn.8, 9, 426 A.2d at 481 nn.8, 9. In two of the cases cited by the court of
appeals, the courts treated the likelihood of sexual activity as only one among several factors to be
considered. Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 703, 447 A.2d 1244, 1254
(1982); In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 567-70, 432 N.E.2d 712, 721-22 (1982). In In re Guardianship of
Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 578-79, 307 N.W.2d 881, 899 (1981), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that Wisconsin courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction over sterilization petitions until the
state legislature passes legislation condoning sterilization. Under the standards applied in Moe, the
weight to be given each of the relevant factors varies according to the facts of the case. Moe, 385
Mass. at 569 n.10, 307 N.E.2d at 722 n.10. In Wyatt v. Anderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383, 1384 (1973),
the court did not mention the likelihood of sexual activity, although it did require a showing that no
temporary birth control method would adequately meet the respondent's needs. In In re A.W., 637
P.2d 366, 375 (Colo. 1981), there was also no requirement concerning sexual activity, but petitioner
was required to show that sterilization was "clearly necessary... to preserve the life or physical or
mental health" of the respondent. Only one of the cases cited applied a requirement of proof that
sexual activity is likely such as that applied in Truesdell. See In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash.
228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980).
116. See infra text accompanying notes 131-34.
117. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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supreme court avoided evaluating the analysis the court of appeals employed in
reaching that finding.' 18 Arguably, the fact that the court accepted the court of
appeals' finding that sterilization was not in Truesdell's best interests implies
approval of the court of appeals' analysis. The description of best interests anal-
ysis that the court provided, however, contrasts sharply with the court of ap-
peals' treatment of Truesdell's interests. The court specifically stated that the
court of appeals' standards were not an exclusive list and directed future courts
to look for guidance to the more comprehensive analyses applied by courts in
other jurisdictions.' 19
Although the supreme court's opinion does provide some guidance on the
nature of the best interests analysis to be used by courts reviewing sterilization
petitions, it provides little help to a court faced with the problem of determining
what to do when the result of the best interests analysis conflicts with the result
mandated by the statutory standards. As a result, a court faced with that situa-
tion will be caught in a dilemma; forced to ignore either the plain language of
the statute or a standard that the North Carolina Supreme Court found to be
constitutionally required.
The Truesdell court provided some insight into the reason it chose not to
address this contingency when it stated that it was "persuaded and influenced by
the standards promulgated by the states in other jurisdictions,"' 2 0 but noted
that "these courts were not required to judicially interpret a statute as is this
Court."'12 1 The courts whose standards persuaded the Truesdell court generally
applied best interests analyses that did not include any bright-line test regarding
sexual activity.'122 Several of the courts specifically forbade any consideration of
the state's interests. 123 The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, upheld
the constitutionality of statutory standards based entirely on the state's interests
in Moore 124 and interpreted those standards in Truesdell to require proof that
118. If the supreme court had reached the issue whether sterilization was in Truesdell's best
interests, it would have been faced with the issue whether it was proper for the court of appeals to
create and apply the rule that sterilization can be in a respondent's best interests only when the
respondent is likely to be sexually active, in spite of the trial court's finding that sterilization was in
Truesdell's best interest. If the supreme court had accepted the trial court's finding, it would have
been squarely confronted with the conflict between the statutory and best interests standards.
119. Truesdell, 313 N.C. at 430-31, 329 S.E.2d at 635-36. The court's statement that "[t]he trial
judge, in his discretion, may consider certain other factors that he considers to be reflective of the
best interests of the respondent in any particular circumstance," id. at 430-31, 329 S.E.2d at 636,
suggests a careful weighing of all the facts and circumstances of each particular case. This kind of
analysis is markedly different from the court of appeals' strict application of a generalized rule defin-
ing the best interests of all retarded people.
Another significant indicator of the contrast between the supreme court's and court of appeals'
treatment of a best interests analysis is that the courts whose standards the supreme court directed
trial judges to rely upon, see supra note 27, generally applied a comprehensive best interests analysis
in which likelihood of sexual activity was only one among many factors considered. See supra note
115.
120. Truesdell, 313 N.C. at 430, 329 S.E.2d at 635.
121. Id. at 429-30, 329 S.E.2d at 635.
122. See supra note 115.
123. See, eg., In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 375-76 (Colo. 1981); Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen.
Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 704-05, 447 A.2d 1244, 1254 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983); In
re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 262 n.8, 426 A.2d 467, 481 n.8 (1981).
124. Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976).
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sexual activity be likely. As a result, North Carolina's courts must apply the
statutory standards as modified by the requirement concerning sexual activity.
At the same time, they are constitutionally required to apply some best interests
standards. Producing a coherent integration of these incompatible sets of stan-
dards is a Herculean task. It is not surprising that the court declined to make
the attempt when it was not forced to do so.
The Truesdell court was able to avoid addressing the potential for conflict
between the standards only because it accepted the court of appeals' finding that
in such a situation, application of either of the two standards would produce
identical results. Eventually, a case will arise in which the conflict is directly at
issue. The court's lament that, unlike other courts, it is required to interpret a
statute125 could be interpreted as a plea to the general assembly to free it from
the burden that North Carolina's sterilization statute represents.
The time is ripe for the general assembly to address the problems raised by
Truesdell by redrafting North Carolina's sterilization statute. The current stat-
utory scheme, based on state interests, should be abandoned and replaced with a
requirement that the reviewing court engage in a comprehensive analysis of the
facts and circumstances of each case and base its decision solely upon the best
interests of the individual respondent. 126
The existing statute, as modified by the requirement of proof that sexual
activity be likely, is plagued by serious deficiencies. Proving a clear and present
danger of sexual activity is likely to be difficult. The requirement that the peti-
tioner do so may mean that sterilization will rarely be performed in time to
accomplish its purpose. Serious questions exist as to what type of evidence will
be sufficient to meet this new requirement, and there is a significant danger that
the stringency of the standard, rather than protecting the rights of retarded per-
sons, will only subject them to increased invasions of privacy. Furthermore,
because the current statute requires that rights yield to state interests, the North
Carolina Supreme Court was constitutionally required to graft best interests
standards onto the statute. The result is a mixture of incompatible standards
that will be extremely difficult for trial courts to apply.
Ironically, although the purpose of the statute is to further state interests, it
is not clear that it is effective in doing so. In Moore the interests purported to be
furthered by the statute were identified as the state's interests in protecting po-
tential children of mentally retarded parents and in preventing the procreation
of children who may become a burden on the state. 127 The notion that potential
children are protected when the state ensures that they will not be born is troub-
lesome at best.128 The new standards imposed by Truesdell make the peti-
125. Truesdell, 313 N.C. at 429-30, 329 S.E.2d at 635.
126. In such an analysis the likelihood of sexual activity as well as the other factors mentioned in
Truesdell, see supra note 25, would be among the factors the court "considers to be reflective of the
best interests of the respondent." Truesdell, 313 N.C. at 430-31, 329 S.E.2d at 636. The weight to be
given each factor should vary according to the circumstances of each case. See In re Moe, 385 Mass.
555, 569 n.10, 432 N.E.2d 712, 722 n.10 (1982).
127. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
128. The belief that sterilization is necessary to protect the unborn child is largely based on
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tioner's burden difficult to meet. 129 The actual savings to the state that might
result from sterilizations that would be performed under the current statute, but
would be prohibited by a statutory test containing only best interests standards
is not likely to be significant.
1 30
The most important advantage of a best interests standard is that it is the
only type of standard that truly protects the rights of the mentally retarded. The
United States Supreme Court has described the procreative right as follows: "If
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free
from governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 13 1 The rights of mentally re-
tarded persons extend beyond the right to be free from being subjected to sterili-
zation when it is not necessitated by a compelling state interest. They have a
right to make their own independent decision whether to procreate or refrain
from procreating based entirely upon their own interests. 132 This right has been
held to include a right to choose to be sterilized. 133 The right to procreative
autonomy is too important to be forfeited just because the individual is incompe-
tent to make that choice. 13 4 "To preserve that right and the benefits that a
meaningful decision would bring to [a retarded person's] life, it may be neces-
sary to assert it on her behalf." 135 If a court is to step into the shoes of a men-
eugenic theories-theories which, except for cases involving a few specific diseases, are scientifically
discredited. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. Empirical evidence reveals that 90% of
mentally retarded persons are only mildly retarded, Murdock, supra note 55, at 928, and that many
are capable of providing the affection, care, and intellectual stimulation necessary for a reasonable
environment for children. S. VIrrELLO & R. SOSKIN, MENTAL RETARDATION: ITS SOCIAL AND
LEGAL CONTEXT 93-94 (1985); Note, Retarded Parents in Neglect Proceedings: The Erroneous As-
sumption of Parental Inadequacy, 31 STAN. L. REv. 785, 789-90 (1979). Furthermore, among those
individuals who have deficiencies in parenting ability, many can be adequate parents if they receive
assistance from social agencies. In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 236-37, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980). It
is questionable whether singling retarded persons out for sterilization, while permitting other groups
likely to be inadequate parents, such as alcoholics or people previously convicted of child abuse, to
have children qualifies as a rational method of protecting future children. The argument that un-
born children of mentally retarded persons have an interest in having their potential parents steril-
ized necessarily implies that the family environments to which they would be exposed would be so
bad that they have an interest in not being born. In light of the reverence with which society regards
human life, such an argument is highly controversial at best. Sde Note, Azzolino v. Dingfelder:
North Carolina Court of Appeals Recognizes Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims, 63 N.C.L.
REv. 1329 (1984); Note, supra note 81, at 778-79 & n.33.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 97-104.
130. The savings to the state resulting from the statute is measured by the cost of supporting
those children who would not be born because of sterilizations that would be conducted under the
present statute, but who actually would be born and become wards of the state if best interests
standards were enacted. It is unlikely that the number of potential wards of the state would be
significantly increased under best interests standards, particularly in light of the stringent standards
imposed by Truesdell. See supra text accompanying notes 97-104. Furthermore, in view of the size
of North Carolina's welfare burden, whatever difference in cost might result is unlikely to be
significant.
131. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (Massachusetts statute prohibiting dissemina-
tion of contraceptives held unconstitutional).
132. In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 369 (Colo. 1981); In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 565-66, 432 N.E.2d
712, 720 (1982); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 263 n.9, 426 A.2d 467, 481 n.9 (1981).
133. Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 368 (D. Conn. 1978).
134. In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 369 (Colo. 1981); In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 565, 432 N.E.2d
712, 720 (1982); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 250, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (1981).
135. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 250-51, 426 A.2d 467, 475 (1981).
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tally retarded person and exercise that person's right to make choices about
procreation on his or her behalf, it must do so solely on the basis of that individ-
ual's best interests. In making such decisions, a court should not rely on general
rules about the best interests of mentally retarded people as a class.
The determination of a mentally retarded person's best interests must al-
ways rest on a complex mix of circumstances. It is unrealistic to expect that any
single bright-line test will adequately distinguish those individuals whose inter-
ests would be served by sterilization. The application of a strict requirement of
sexual activity without consideration of the particular circumstances of each in-
dividual respondent may prevent sterilization when it would be in the individ-
ual's best interests and allow sterilization when it would not.136
Another benefit of a best interests analysis is that it would provide North
Carolina courts with a simpler, more logically consistent standard by which to
review sterilization petitions than that which exists in the wake of Truesdell.
The best interests analysis is a familiar tool that is routinely applied in adoption
and child custody cases 137 and in other instances in which courts must make
important decisions on behalf of incompetent individuals. 138 Courts, which al-
ready employ a best interests analysis in making decisions in these sensitive ar-
eas, will be better able to apply a similar analysis in reviewing sterilization
petitions than to interpret the conflicting sets of standards which now exist.
Each petition will present its own unique set of considerations. The task of
weighing and balancing these considerations as they vary from case to case is
particularly well suited to the equitable powers of a court.
We do not pretend that the choice of her parents, her guardian ad litem, or a court is her
own choice. But it is a genuine one nevertheless-one designed to further the same inter-
ests she might pursue had she the ability to decide herself. We believe that having the
choice made in her behalf produces a more just and compassionate result than leaving...
[the respondent]... with no way of exercising a constitutional right.
Id. at 261, 426 A.2d at 481.
Other courts view such a choice in a wholly different light. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
rejected the Grady approach, stating: "It is not a personal choice, and no amount of legal legerde-
main can make it so." In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 566, 307 N.W.2d 881, 893 (1981). The
Eberhardy court argued that such a choice may reflect the best interests of parents or social workers
rather than of the respondent. Id. at 573, 307 N.W.2d at 897. The court provided no solution of its
own but merely directed Wisconsin courts to refuse jurisdiction over sterilization petitions. Id. at
578-79, 307 N.W.2d at 899.
136. Several of the courts upon which the supreme court relied thought that other factors might
outweigh the likelihood of sexual activity because they included that factor as only one among many
in their analyses. See supra note 115. There are reasons why sterilization might be in a retarded
person's best interests regardless of whether he or she is likely to engage in sexual activity. See Note,
Procreation: A Choice for the Mentally Retarded, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 359, 365-66 & nn.70-74 (1984)
(citing factual examples from cases); Note, Ruby v. Massey: Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded, 9
CAP. U.L. RV. 191, 194 (1979). There is little reason to believe that just because the statutory
standards are met, sterilization is in the best interests of the respondent. The statutory standards
were not designed to further the interests of the respondent. See supra note 81. The very reason that
best interests standards are constitutionally required is that the statutory standards do not ade-
quately protect the respondent's interests. Otherwise, a best interests analysis would be superfluous.
137. E.g., Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 216 S.E.2d 1 (1975) (best interests of the child is the
paramount consideration in custody disputes); accord Campbell v. Campbell, 63 N.C. App. 113, 304
S.E.2d 262, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 460, 307 S.E.2d 362 (1983).
138. E.g., In re Wharton, 305 N.C. 565, 290 S.E.2d 688 (1982) (best interests analysis applied in
commitment hearing); Wells v. Dickens, 274 N.C. 203, 162 S.E.2d 552 (1968) (court reviewing
guardian's decision not to take against will must determine best interests of the incompetent).
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Under the existing statute, mentally retarded people are forced to surrender
the free exercise of a fundamental right, the right to procreation. Their sacrifice
brings the state of North Carolina only very limited benefits. In attempting to
balance these competing interests, North Carolina's courts have been forced to
recognize an unworkable combination of contradictory requirements that does
not further the interests of either the state or the mentally retarded citizen.
There can be no guarantee that a best interests analysis will reach the result that
is truly in the best interests of the respondent, but at least such a procedure
would represent society's best attempt to serve those interests. Focusing on the
respondent's interests instead of the state's interests-acting on behalf of the
mentally retarded person instead of acting against the mentally retarded per-
son-would give North Carolina's sterilization procedures a realistic possibility
of achieving some beneficial results and thereby give it a legitimacy it now lacks.
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